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Bhopal's Legacy: Lessons for Third World Host
Nations and for Multinational Corporations
Eileen N. Wagner*
I. Introduction
Third world countries, out of a desperate need for hard cur-
rency, are trying hard to attract multinational chemical corporations
to enter joint ventures. Romania is an example of one such country
that has put out the invitation for joint ventures.' With chemicals
comprising more than 16% of Romania's commodity output, the
joint venture invitations the Romanians are most interested in
having answered are those directed towards multinational chemical
corporations, including the American-based Dow Chemical
Corporation. 2
Romania is not alone in trying to attract multinational chemical
corporations to enter joint ventures. Chemical production is the sin-
gle largest and fastest growing candidate for joint ventures in third
world countries. 3 From the standpoint of the multinationals, the at-
tractiveness of such ventures is not isolated to answering the hard
currency and employment needs of struggling third world econo-
mies. Rather, the multinationals find enticing the prospect of manu-
facturing chemical commodities in a friendly regulatory atmosphere
at a time when the United States and other advanced industrial na-
tions are becoming more and more aggressive in legislating and en-
forcing environmental and occupational protections. 4 Upsetting the
convenient balance of these needs is the fact that chemical manufac-
turing is especially prone to accident with "the number of innocent
* Editor, Lex Claudia, Journal of the Virginia Women Attorneys Association; B.S.,
Virginia Commonwealth, 1969; M.Ed., Ed.D., University of Virginia, 1970, 1975; J.D., Uni-
versity of Richmond, 1991.
I See Romania Seeks Foreign Partners for Chemical Joint-Ventures, Int'l Petrochemical Rep.,
June 28, 1990, vol. 9, no. 26 (changes), at 7.
2 Id.
3 See generally W. BOGARD, THE BHOPAL TRAGEDY: LANGUAGE, LOGIC, & POLITICS IN
PRODUCTION OF A HAZARD 25-26 (1989)(stating that the international chemicals market has
experienced tremendous growth over the last two decades).
4 See generally McGarity, Bhopal & the Export of Hazardous Technologies, 20 TEX. INT'L
L. J. 333 (1985) (exploring methods of preventing the exportation of hazardous
technologies).
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bystanders being killed on the increase." 5
Environmental critics in the 1970's pointed to the tendency of
industry to take the course of least resistance (i.e., build chemical
plants in countries with minimal environmental standards) when do-
mestic governments instituted stringent controls on manufacturing
and sales of potentially hazardous materials. 6 Pressure on the home
front simply encouraged manufacturers to "dump" banned or re-
stricted products onto the third world market. In the 1980's, the re-
sponse to complaints about this practice was essentially "caveat
emptor." 7 Third world markets, according to the Reagan adminis-
tration, could decide for themselves if they wanted to purchase prod-
ucts which were banned in the United States.8 Protecting the rest of
the world from potentially hazardous products took a low priority in
relation to allowing the free flow of world trade.9
If the United States (U.S.) has taken a disinterested view of the
export of potentially hazardous products to the third world,' 0 it has
taken even less interest in what hazardous manufacturing processes
may be exported." In contrast, the development of occupational
and environmental standards for manufacturing operations within
the U.S. has proceeded at a rapid pace. The cost of complying with
stringent U.S. regulations creates an incentive for manufacturers to
move their operations to countries where no such regulations
exist. 12
Manufacturers are eager to set up their plants in relatively un-
regulated third world countries. These third world countries, de-
lighted to have large multinational manufacturers located within
their borders, are often willing to turn a blind regulatory eye to the
multinationals' activities. Everyone is happy until tragedy strikes in
the form of a deadly accident. The leak of methyl isocyanate from
5 W. BOGARD, supra note 3, at 106.
6 See generally THE EXPORT OF HAZARD: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & ENVIRON-
MENTAL CONTROL ISSUES U. Ives ed. 1985).
7 W. BOGARD, supra note 3, at 111.
8 See McGarity, supra note 4, at 334.
9 See generally King, Hazardous Exports: A Consumer Perspective, in THE EXPORT OF HAZ-
ARD: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ISSUES (J. Ives ed.
1985) (barrier to creation and implementation of export notification system rooted in gov-
ernmental reluctance to inhibit trade).
10 Where national security may be directly affected, the United States takes a very
keen interest in exports. See 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-2405 (1988). See also Chemical & Bio-
logical Weapons Threat: The Urgent Need for Remedies: Hearings before the Senate Comm. on Foreign
Relations, 101st Cong., Ist Sess., 29-45 (1989)(discussing use of governmental sanctions to
discourage development and use of biological and chemical weapons by other countries).
I I See generally Levenstein & Eller, Exporting Hazardous Industries, in THE EXPORT OF
HAZARD: TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS & ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROL ISSUES (J. Ives ed.
1985)(arguing that "international solidarity," not concern for loss of American jobs,
should be the basis for criticism of exportation of hazardous chemicals).
12 See generally McGarity, supra note 4 (discussing the high cost of doing business in a
highly regulated environment).
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the Union Carbide India Limited (UCIL) plant in Bhopal, India, on
December 3, 1984 was such a tragic accident. The entire world
stood aghast 13 at the news that a cloud of poisonous gas used to
make the pesticide Sevin had escaped from storage, by-passing two
fail-safe systems, to kill between 2000 and 8000 people and perma-
nently injure more than 200,000.14 The incident smeared the ideal-
istic tableau that depicted Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) as an
American-based multinational chemical corporation working hand-
in-hand with India to advance its "green revolution" and to solve its
vast economic problems.
For several years after the disaster at Bhopal, it appeared that
UCC, the parent company, would lose its corporate life on the altar
of revenge and remorse.' 5 Yet, by 1987, UCC emerged from the
tragedy stronger than ever. 16 By 1989, UCC had closed the Bhopal
chapter of its corporate history and had created a way for future mul-
tinational corporations to substantially limit their liability, at least in
tort. The decision of the Southern District of New York and of the
Second Circuit' 7 serve as useful guidelines that ought to be followed
in negotiating joint venture agreements between third world coun-
tries and multinational chemical corporations.
This Article examines the legacy of the gas leak disaster in Bho-
pal and its profound, though ironic, effect on the terms a multina-
tional corporation will wish to include in agreements allocating
liability for loss resulting from the operation of processes necessary
to produce hazardous chemicals. Surprisingly, the complex multina-
tional corporate structure which separates a subsidiary located in
host countries from the corporate parent located in the U.S. does not
emerge as the focus for limiting liability. Rather, by applying the
doctrine offorum non conveniens, the federal courts placed greater em-
phasis on the interests of the host government than on the corporate
relationship of the subsidiary to the parent. This Article explains
why American-based multinational corporations, when structuring
joint-ventures with third-world host countries, must resist the temp-
1s For a listing of the measures taken by a shocked world-wide chemical industry, see
P. SHRIVASTAVA, BHOPAL: ANATOMY OF A CRISIS 83-84 (1987).
14 Death and injury figures vary widely; lower figures were estimates of the Indian
government which wishes to minimize the extent of the damage in the press. See P.
SHRIVASTAVA, supra note 13, at 64-67.
15 See Barr, Why India's Awkward Strategy Forced the Settlement, AM. LAw., May 1989, at
99.
16 After his retirement, announced in November, 1986, Chief Executive Officer War-
ren B. Anderson said about Union Carbide: "[W]e developed competence and capability
... that we never had before .... Union Carbide is a $7 billion, very viable organization
that will grow faster than the economy. I don't feel we're in any way a struggling company
.... Earnings per share will go up." D. KURZMAN, A KILLING WIND: INSIDE UNION CAR-
BIDE & THE BHOPAL CATASTROPHE 232 (1987).
17 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
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tation to take advantage of governments which are unsophisticated
or permissive, characteristics often regarded as prime attractions for
locating hazardous chemical manufacturing plants in those
countries.
II. Complaint and Memoranda of the Parties
If litigation of the Bhopal incident were to have taken place in an
U.S. court, the closeness of UCC's relationship with UCIL would
have been a central issue. Accordingly, the Union of India and the
individual plaintiffs attempted to convince the court that the rela-
tionship between the Indian subsidiary and the American parent
should be the basis for granting trial in an U.S. court. 18
A. Union of India's Complaint'9
The Union of India, typical of tort plaintiffs, sought relief from
the parent company, Union Carbide Corporation, the entity with the
deepest pockets. In its complaint to the United States District Court
for the Southern District of New York, the Union of India presented
seven counts based on different theories of liability.
1. Multinational Enterprise Liability
The Indian government argued that because the multinational
corporation is not subject to any specific international law which
holds it liable for the harm it causes, it assumes "a primary, absolute
and non-delegable duty to the persons and country in which it has in
any manner caused to be undertaken any ultrahazardous or inher-
ently dangerous activity."' 20 Had UCC sought to dispute the imposi-
tion of this duty, the Union of India would have been hard pressed to
point to law supporting it.21 The law to be applied in the case of tort
must be the law of a jurisdiction, either the law of India or of the
18 Cases on behalf of individual Indian victims filed in various federal courts were
consolidated in the Southern District of New York in February 1985 with the consolidated
complaint superseding earlier complaints in June 1985. The Union of India filed its com-
plaint in April 1985. Later that month, the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee was appointed
consisting of F. Lee Bailey and Stanley Chesley, representing counsel for the individual
plaintiffs, and Michael Ciresi, counsel for the Union of India.
19 See U. BAxI & T. PAUL, MASS DISASTERS AND MULTINATIONAL LIABILITY: THE
BHOPAL CASE (1986). Under the auspices of The Indian Law Institute, briefs submitted to
United States District Court for the Southern District of New York were compiled in this
book, published by N. M. Tripathi of Bombay. Pagination for (1) Union of India's
Complaint, (2) Memorandum of Law in Support of Union Carbide Corporation's Motion
to Dismiss [hereinafter Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss], and (3) Memorandum of Law
in Opposition to Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss [hereinafter Plaintiffs' Motion in
Opposition] will be the pagination in the Baxi & Paul compilation.
20 Union of India's Complaint, supra note 19, at 5.
21 Multinational codes setting "a duty to manage responsibly" were still evolving. See
Westbrook, Theories of Parent Company Liability and the Prospects for an International Settlement,
20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 321, 323 (1985).
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United States. 22 Because India had no codified tort law and very lim-
ited precedent with the common law of tort, the Union of India
sought to bring its complaint before an American court where expe-
rience with complex tort litigation was extensive and where it would
benefit from the more liberal standards of proof afforded by the
strict liability theory of products liability.
UCC's duty of care, necessary for a products liability cause of
action, to the safety of employees and residents of Bhopal need not
have rested upon a dubious foundation of "multinational enterprise
liability" as outlined in the Union of India's complaint. 23 Rather,
UCC could be said to have assumed the duty to protect the employ-
ees and residents by their conduct. The design of the plant, the
training of the employees in following safety standards and proce-
dures, and the decision to build the plant in an unpopulated area
would all be indicators that UCC had assumed the duty to protect
employees and residents. Likewise, UCC's promotional and stock-
holder materials touted the company's world-wide safety record and
would have given evidence of their assumption of a common-law
duty. The very appearance of Warren B. Anderson in Bhopal just
days after the accident should be taken as evidence that the parent
company assumed some level of the duty of care.24
2. Products Liability
In five counts of its complaint against UCC, the Union of India
set out a standard panoply of products liability theories. The highest
in the hierarchy of liability, absolute liability, requires no assignment
of fault, nor any examination of the nature of the breach in the duty
of care. If a substance is deemed ultrahazardous, the one who keeps
such a thing is absolutely liable for its escape and any subsequent
harm.2 5
Strict liability requires a defect that renders the product "unrea-
sonably dangerous." Recognized in all but four American jurisdic-
22 Hofstetter, Multinational Enterprise Parent Liability: Efficient Legal Regimes in the Modem
Market Environment, 15 N.CJ. INT'L L. & CoM. REG. 299, 325 (1990).
23 Michael Ciresi of Robins, Zelle represented the Union of India and drafted the
complaint.
24 See A. DE GRANIZA, A CLOUD OVER BHOPAL: CAUSES, CONSEQUENCES & CONSTRUC-
TIVE SOLUTIONS 18-19 (1985). For a poignant narrative of Anderson's arrest in Bhopal and
period of detention, see D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 116-19, 124-27. For a discussion of
the "assumption of duty," see BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CON-
TRACT & OTHER COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDI-
ARY CORPORATIONS 318 (1987).
25 See Rylands v. Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & I. App. 330 (H.L. 1868). "[W]here defendant
exercises a measure of control over a hazard, and the hazard escapes, with resultant dam-
age to the plaintiff, there is liability without a need to show fault." Weinberg, Insights &
Ironies: The American Bhopal Cases, 20 TEX. INTL L.J. 307, 309 (1985)(quoting Rylands v.
Fletcher, 3 L.R.-E. & App. 330 (H.L. 1868)).
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tions, 26 strict liability sets aside the issue of fault for commercial
sellers by requiring that the defect be present when the commodity
left the hands of the manufacturer. The Union of India's strongest
case rested on the relatively new tenets of strict liability developed by
the American courts in products liability cases. 2 7 The principal alle-
gation against UCC was one of design defect. The Union of India
alleged that UCC knew that the design of the tanks holding the
methyl isocyanate was inadequate and that fail-safe devices were in-
adequately maintained. Furthermore, the Union of India alleged
that UCC had issued an internal report describing the potential for
exactly the sort of runaway reaction which occurred in Bhopal,
thereby establishing the accident's foreseeability. Given that the na-
ture of the accident was foreseeable, the Union of India alleged that
UCC provided no information concerning protection against a leak
or medical treatment in the event of a leak.
Under a negligence theory of liability, the Union of India main-
tained that UCC had a duty of reasonable care to warn of dangers
and risks inherent in the methyl isocyanate manufacturing process.
Its failure to warn of these dangers constituted a breach of a duty of
reasonable care, thus bringing the actions of UCC within the com-
mon-law tenets of negligence, a theory of liability recognized in
every American jurisdiction. Rather than identifying the source of
the required fault, the Union of India alleged that UCC's exclusive
control plus the nature of the gas leak presented what would ordina-
rily be called a "res ipsa loquitur" allegation of liability; i.e., the acci-
dent, more probably than not, could not have occurred without the
fault of some individual or group within Union Carbide Corporation.
The Union of India also alleged breach of warranty and misrep-
resentation, two theories of liability in contract. Under breach of
warranty, the Union of India alleged that UCC had warranted its
Bhopal plant safe during the design and construction stage. 28 Under
26 Four American jurisdictions still do not recognize strict liability in product liability
cases: Delaware, Massachusetts, North Carolina, and Virginia.
27 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 402A (1965) states:
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably danger-
ous to the user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physi-
cal harm thereby caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property,
if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without sub-
stantial change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (I) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale
of his product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered
into any contractual relation with the seller.
Id.
28 Hofstetter explained the breach of contract theory:
Union Carbide was accused of having breached its promise to the Indian gov-
ernment that it would use state of the art technology at its Indian plant. In-
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misrepresentation, the Union of India alleged that UCC had repre-
sented the plant as designed in accordance with the best information
available and that it would be maintained with current and up-to-
date knowledge.29
3. Liability for Malicious Conduct
Because UCC knew of the extreme danger posed by methyl iso-
cyanate, the Union of India alleged the chemical company's actions
to be "unlawful, wilful, malicious and reprehensible... in deliberate,
conscious and wanton disregard of the rights and safety of the citi-
zens of the Union of India. '"5 0 If the Union of India could prove
UCC's actions to be wilful and malicious, it could ask the court to
impose punitive as well as compensatory damages for the tort
counts.
4. Damages
The scope of compensatory damages alone was wide including
not only compensation for death and injury to humans but to live-
stock and crops as well.3 ' Estimates of the actual damages ran from
a low of $350 million, the figure comprising the aborted 1986 settle-
ment attempt between UCC and individual victims represented by an
executive committee of American attorneys, to a high of $2.04 bil-
lion, a 1986 estimate made by Morehouse and Subramaniam. 32
B. Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss
Citing Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno,33 and Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert,34
UCC side-stepped all the allegations presented in the Union of In-
dia's complaint by insisting that India was the appropriate forum of
the litigation, not the Southern District of New York.
1. Plaintiffs' Choice of Forum
Under the tenets of forum non conveniens, a court may use its dis-
cretion to decide whether it or another forum is more convenient for
the defendant. Normally, the plaintiffs' choice of forum is given def-
erence, unless the plaintiff is foreign. 35 Moreover, the mere fact that
stead of solving this issue under the inflexible concept of piercing the
corporate veil it could be more readily tackled as a problem of international
law or host country contract or tort law.
Hofstetter, supra note 22, at 319-20. However, Hofstetter fails to cite any specific law
under which this might be done.
29 Union of India's Complaint, supra note 19, at 8.
30 Id. at 8.
31 Id. at 8-9.
32 p. SHRIVASTAVA, supra note 13, at 82.
33 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
34 330 U.S. 501 (1947).
35 Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235 (1981).
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the law in the alternative forum is less favorable to the plaintiff is not
enough, by itself, to overturn an assertion by a defendant that the
alternative forum is more convenient for trial.36 Thus, the Union of
India could not force a court in the United States to hear its com-
plaint against UCC merely on the grounds that the award of damages
in India would likely be significantly less than under the liberal prod-
ucts liability law of the United States.
The objective of policing products made in the United States
which cause injury to foreign users was likewise set aside as inade-
quate motive for allowing foreign citizens to bring a cause of action
against U.S. citizens in U.S. courts. In Piper, a products liability ac-
tion stemming from a commuter aircraft accident in Scotland, the
U.S. Supreme Court wrote:
[E]nsuring that American manufacturers are deterred from produc-
ing defective products, and that additional deterrence might be ob-
tained if [defendants] were tried in the United States where they
could be sued on the basis of both negligence and strict liability [is
one suggested interest]. However, the incremental deterrence that
would be gained if their trial were held in an American court is likely
to be insignificant. The American interest in this accident is simply
not sufficient to justify the enormous commitment of judicial time
and resources that would inevitably be required if the case were
tried here.37
UCC turned to its advantage the element of low U.S. interest
cited by the Piper Court by contrasting the low U.S. interest with the
enormity of the Indian interest in the litigation, which in the earliest
stages involved 100 separate cases in the United States and over
1200 cases in India.3 8 In short, if there existed a more convenient
alternative forum in India, there was no incentive for an American
court to take on litigation of such size and complexity as the Bhopal
case.
2. Private Interest
In applying the balancing of interests test outlined in Gilbert and
applied in Piper, the U.S. Supreme Court listed certain private inter-
ests to be taken into consideration, including access to proof, availa-
bility of compulsory process, cost of bringing in witnesses, need to
view the premises, and whatever elements make a trial expeditious
and inexpensive.
a. Access to Proof
The Motion to Dismiss filed by UCC listed the following factors
36 Id. at 247, 251.
37 454 U.S. at 260-61.
38 Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 33.
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in support of its contention that an Indian forum would afford much
greater access to proof than would an U.S. forum:
(1) The incident occurred in India;
(2) Tens of thousands of plaintiffs suing for personal injuries
were Indian citizens residing in India;
(3) All of the decedents were Indian citizens residing in India;
(4) Management and employees of the Bhopal plant were all In-
dian citizens residing in India;
(5) Virtually all the physicians and nurses who treated the pa-
tients are Indian citizens residing in India;
(6) All medical records are located in India;
(7) The incident was investigated by authorities in India;
(8) Blueprints and design drawings were made in India as re-
quired by the Indian government;
(9) The plant was constructed by Indian companies in India;
(10) All the records of the day-to-day management, operations,
and maintenance of the plant were in India;
(11) UCIL was governed by Indian laws and regulations con-
cerning chemical manufacturing, safety and environment.3 9
In addition, after the accident the Indian government took con-
trol of the plant and its records.
b. Compulsory Process
UCC argued that an American court could not obtain jurisdic-
tion over unwilling third party witnesses to the accident who reside
in India. This would significantly damage Union Carbide Corpora-
tion's defense because those persons who may have caused the acci-
dent would likely be unwilling to appear without compulsory
process. Moreover, should the trial proceed without compulsory
process, UCC argued its fifth amendment rights would be violated.40
More importantly, UCIL itself would not be subject to suit in the
United States because Indian law prohibits a majority shareholder
from consenting to jurisdiction in another forum.4 1
c. Cost of Transporting Witnesses
Because of the large numbers of third party witnesses necessary
to advance the trial, UCC argued that the cost of transportation and
lodging would be prohibitive. In Bouvy-Loggers v. Pan American World
Airways, Inc. ,42 the New York federal district court dismissed a suit by
39 Id. at 34-37.
40 "Due Process requires that there be an opportunity to present every available de-
fense .... American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932).
41 Indian Companies Act of 1956.
42 15 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,153 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
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a citizen from the Netherlands, stating:
The witnesses and documents with regard to this issue were located
in the Netherlands. To bring these witnesses and documents to New
York for trial as opposed to conducting the trial in the Netherlands
would clearly have been inconsistent with the goal of making the
disposition of cases "easy, expeditious and inexpensive." 4 3
d. View of the Premises
UCC further argued that the court would need a view of the ac-
tual Bhopal plant and its environs in order to deal with the issues of
fact surrounding the allegation of sabotage. Additionally, the trier of
fact would need to see the location of shantytown population centers
in relation to the plant itself in order make accurate assessments con-
cerning damages.
3. Public Interests
The second prong of the balancing test for forum non conveniens
analysis is the weight of the public interest.4 4 A primary concern is
the imposition of unnecessary burden on the American court. Issues
of pressure on the court docket can be off-set by local interest in the
litigation, especially since local citizens might be burdened with jury
duty. Moreover, the conversance of the forum with the law to be
applied and the possibility of avoidance of conflict of laws issues are
factors that enter the public interest equation.
a. Unnecessary Burden on the American Court
In the absence of a strong public interest in the litigation, the
availability of a more convenient forum elsewhere cannot be ig-
nored. The principal interest that the United States might take in the
Bhopal litigation is that of holding its own corporate citizens ac-
countable for their actions outside the jurisdiction. However, this
interst was found to be inadequate in Gilbert and Piper.45 American
courts are not "world" courts, argued UCC, citing the U.S. Supreme
Court's opinion in Gilbert: "Administrative difficulties follow courts
when litigation is piled up in congested centers instead of being han-
dled at its origin. Jury duty is a burden that ought not be imposed
upon the people of a community which has no relation to the litiga-
tion."' 46 Repeatedly, American courts have found the assumption of
administrative burdens for foreign litigation to be inappropriate. 4 7
43 Id. at 17,154.
44 See Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09; Piper, 454 U.S. at 259-61.
45 Id.
46 Gilbert, 330 U.S. at 508-09.
47 See, e.g., Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co., 757 F.2d 1215, 1217 (11th Cir. 1985);
Schertenleib v. Traum, 589 F.2d 1156, 1163 (2d Cir. 1978); Domingo v. States Marine
Line, 340 F. Supp. 811, 816 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
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UCC argued that language would be an additional burden since
English is spoken only by the educated classes in India. While Hindi
is spoken by most people in the Bhopal area, India has a total of
fifteen different languages and as many as 1500 regional dialects.48
Utilization of a wide range of languages in the U.S. forum would
make the cost of translation burdensome.
UCC pointed to the decision of a New York state court which
found the U.S. forum inconvenient for foreign litigation because of
the administrative burdens associated with such litigation. In Islamic
Republic of Iran v. Mohammed Reza Pahlavi,49 the New York State Court
of Appeals dismissed a suit against the Shah of Iran for breach of
fiduciary duty, concluding: "[T]axpayers of this State should not be
compelled to assume the heavy financial burden attributable to the
cost of administering the litigation contemplated when their interest
in the suit and the connection of its subject matter . . . is so
ephemeral.''50
b. Application and Conflict of Law
Because the Union of India sought to bring its cause of action in
federal court on an issue not arising under a federal question, the
court was forced to turn to the law of the state in which it sits to make
its choice of law determination. 5' Each state has its own system for
determining when and if the law of another jurisdiction should be
applied. In New York, under the interchangeable labels of "center
of gravity," "grouping of contacts," or "governmental interest," the
law of the jurisdiction with the greatest interest applies. 52 India was
the jurisdiction with the most significant relationship to the accident
and as such, the jurisdiction with the greatest interest. Quoting
Judge Friendly in Conte v. Flota Mercante Del Estado,5 3 UCC argued for
application of Indian law: "[Applying foreign law], where we have
no clear guides, our labors, moulded by our own habits of mind as
they necessarily must be, may produce a result whose conformity
with that of the foreign court may be greater in theory than in
fact." 54
4. Enforceability of an American Judgment
UCC argued that the Indian Code of Civil Procedure and Indian
48 Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 47.
49 62 N.Y.2d 474, 467 N.E.2d 245, 478 N.Y.S.2d 597 (1984), cert, denied, 469 U.S.
1108 (1985).
50 Id. at 483, 467 N.E.2d at 250, 478 N.Y.S.2d at 602.
51 See Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1964).
52 See Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 41 (citing Babcock v.Jack-
son, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 191 N.E.2d 279, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1963)).
53 277 F.2d 664 (2d Cir. 1960).
54 Id. at 667.
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High Court decisions 55 suggest that India might not recognize and
enforce an American judgment unfavorable to Indian plaintiffs. 56
Conversely, the validity of an Indian judgment against UCC would
be upheld in the United States under the rule of Hilton v. Guyot. 57
[If] a foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a compe-
tent court having jurisdiction of the cause and of the parties, and
upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity to defend against,
and its proceedings are according to the course of a civilized jurispru-
dence, and are stated in a clear and formal record, the judgment is
primafacie evidence, at least, of the truth of the matter adjudged.; and
it should be conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court,
unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the judgment,
as by showing it was affected by fraud or prejudice, or that, by the
principles of international law, and by the comity of our own coun-
try, it should not be given full credit and effect.5 8
5. India as an Adequate Forum
The entire forum non conveniens argument actually turns on the
issue of whether the Union of India could indeed provide an ade-
quate forum for litigating the injuries resulting from the Bhopal Gas
Leak Disaster. In Piper, the U.S. Supreme Court set this single test as
the gate for the rest of the analysis: "At the outset of any forum non
conveniens inquiry, the court must determine whether there exists
an alternative forum." 59 UCC had high praise for the Indian judici-
ary. India is a civilized country, they argued, "operating under dem-
ocratic principles with a common law legal system adopted, like our
own, from the British legal system."' 60 Additionally, the state of
Madhya Pradesh, where the Bhopal plant was located, had waived
court filing fees and had provided free legal assistance to ease the
route of injured Indians through the system. The political system in
India was stable enough for the Indian Minister of Law to tell the
Indian Parliament that "the judicial system in India had reached a
standard which could be considered 'as a model' for other country
[sic] which boast a free judiciary. 61
6. Standing
UCC challenged the Union of India's standing to sue in an
American court by arguing that India's self-imposed status of parens
patriae does not give it the requisite standing.
55 See Moloji Nar Singh Rao v. Shanker Sara, 1962 AIR S.C. 1737.
56 Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 55.
57 159 U.S. 113 (1895).
58 Id. at 205-06 (emphasis added).
59 Piper, 454 U.S. at 254.
60 Union Carbide's Motion to Dismiss, supra note 19, at 53.
61 Id. at 54.
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C. Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition
In its effort to overcome the rationale laid out by UCC in its
Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs6 2 reasserted the close kinship be-
tween UCC and its Indian subsidiary, UCIL. The plaintiffs followed
with an attack aimed at the heart of theforum non conveniens analysis.
The Union of India argued that its judiciary was inadequate to re-
solve the disputes arising from the Bhopal incident. In the wake of
this frontal attack on UCC's Motion to Dismiss, the plaintiffs argued
for the balancing of private and public interests along a different
distribution.
1. Adequacy of Indian Courts
The plaintiffs contended that "[i]f dismissal of an action on forum
non conveniens grounds were not conditioned on the availability of an-
other forum, the plaintiff might find himself with a valid claim but
nowhere to assert it. '"63 Moreover, the burden to prove the exist-
ence of an adequate alternative forum rests with the defendant.6 4
According to Dan Kurzman, in his description of the Bhopal litiga-
tion, " [t]his unprecedented admission by a government that its judi-
cial system offered less justice than did a foreign judicial system
provoked cries of shock and embarrassment in India." 65
The plaintiffs argued that the issue of adequacy of an alternative
forum is not addressed by simply asserting that courts were "avail-
able" in India. Citing Manu International S.A. v. Avon Products, Inc. ,66
the Union of India, along with the individual plaintiffs, asserted that
the "comparative efficacy and efficiency of trying a case in one forum
as opposed to another ' 6 7 had to be considered as well. The short-
comings of the Indian courts in relation to the U.S. courts were sup-
ported by the plaintiffs with expert opinion as well as examples.
Professor Marc Galanter of the University of Wisconsin-Madison
supported the contention that Indian courts were plagued by delay,
that discovery under the Indian Code of Civil Procedure was inade-
62 A Plaintiffs' Executive Committee was formed to represent the Union of India and
individual plaintiffs in federal court. See In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 601
F. Supp. 1035 (J.P.M.L. 1985). The alliance would be an uneasy one with the individual
plaintiffs' attorneys attempting to settle with Union Carbide unilaterally but finally being
blocked by the Union of India. See D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 217-22. When the case
was appealed to the Second Circuit, the plaintiffs broke ranks again. See infra notes 175-91
and accompanying text. Finally, the individual plaintiffs did not join the suit in Indian
courts and their attorneys were left without a means to collect their "reasonable expenses"
from the eventual settlement. See infra notes 196-211 and accompanying text.
63 Farman Farmaian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 437 F. Supp. 910, 915 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 588
F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1977).
64 Cheng v. Boeing Co., 708 F.2d 1406, 1411 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1017
(1983).
65 D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 204.
66 641 F.2d 62 (2d Cir. 1981).
67 Id. at 65.
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quate, that the procedural mechanisms necessary for resolving com-
plex litigation were non-existent, and that neither the bench nor the
bar had the kind of experience necessary to handle mass tort
litigation. 68
a. Problem of Delay in Indian Courts
Plaintiffs argued that "[a]s ofJuly, 1985, more than 40,000 civil
cases were pending in the Supreme Court of India alone."' 69 Half of
these cases had been pending for four years with one eighth pending
for at least ten years. 70 One case, Shanker Das v. Union of India,7 1
came up for a hearing in 1984 even though it was first filed in 1966.
In fact, argued the plaintiffs, this very delay was the basis for the
denial of a forum non conveniens motion in the case of In re Air Crash
Disaster Near Bombay,72 one of the few instances in which an American
court deemed itself the more convenient forum for a foreign citizen
to sue an American defendant for an injury which happened outside
the United States.
While recognizing the ill effects of the delays in their courts, the
Union of India expressed its helplessness to remedy the current situ-
ation. Indian society, plaintiffs explained, is growing while services
cannot keep up with the demands of citizens for their rights. 73 Legal
tradition requires many allegations to be "over-proved" and the
courts have no mechanism for grouping cases or giving priority to
older cases. 74 By recognition of the Indian Law Commission, much
of the delay in the Indian courts is procedural. The gist of the short-
comings of the Indian judiciary as outlined in the affidavit of the
plaintiffs' expert presented a picture of a court system not likely to
make a special effort for these special and pressing disputes arising
from the Bhopal gas leak. 75
b. Inadequate Procedure
The Union of India contended that even if the cases surround-
ing Bhopal could be expedited through the Indian courts, the forum
was nevertheless inadequate. In Mobil Tankers Co. v. Mene Grande Oil
Co., 76 the Venezuelan judicial system was found inadequate because
it "lacked pretrial procedures and placed extraordinary limitations
68 See Galanter, Legal Torpor: Why So Little Has Happened in India After the Bhopal Tragedy,
20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 273 (1985).
69 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 85.
70 Id.
71 2 S.C.C. 358 (1985).
72 531 F. Supp. 1175 (W.D. Wash. 1982).
73 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 86-87.
74 Id. at 86.
75 Id. at 87.
76 363 F.2d 611 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 945 (1966).
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on expert testimony."'77 The absence of pretrial discovery proce-
dures was enough for the Seventh Circuit to find the alternative fo-
rum inadequate in Macedo v. Boeing Co. 78 Because the system of
Indian courts is based more on oral argument than on factual in-
quiry, "[tihe only forms of permissible discovery are written inter-
rogatories, inspection of documents and requests for admissions." 79
Moreover, "[d]iscovery is limited to parties only; third-party wit-
nesses cannot be required to submit to the discovery process."80
No pre-trial conference is available in the Indian forum for the
management of complex cases.8 ' Moreover, third-party practice in
India is a matter of state option.8 2 Madhya Pradesh, the ultimate
location of any Indian litigation, was not one of the states allowing
impleader.83 Finally, India offered no means to consolidate multi-
ple-party suits.8 4
c. Inexperience with Tort Law
That the case against UCC must be made in tort law was widely
accepted by all the parties. India had no codified tort law and it had
very little common-law experience with tort law. Kurzman observed
in A Killing Wind:
Indian lawyers were largely ignorant of tort law; in fact, this is one of
the few major fields of law that has never even been codified in In-
dia. Nor do tort cases usually yield large awards--or lawyers' fees.
Since there are no civil juries in India, judges determine liability and
damages, and they are not overly impressed by calamities that kill
thousands and simply punctuate the rough rhythm of survival in
India.8 5
2. Enforcing an Indian Judgment
The plaintiffs were not impressed with the high-minded lan-
guage of Hilton v. Guyot 86 quoted by UCC in its Motion to Dismiss.
They contended that "[any judgment against Union Carbide in In-
dia would be uncollectible since Union Carbide apparently has no
assets subject to attachment."87 In fact, the only asset in India which
UCC showed on its balance sheet was its ownership equity in UCIL.
The net assets of UCIL amounted to $95.3 million, not enough to
77 Id. at 614.
78 693 F.2d 683, 690 (7th Cir. 1982).
79 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 89.
80 Id.
81 Id. at 89.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 89.
84 Id.
85 D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 195.
86 159 U.S. 113, 205 (1895).
87 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 90.
1991]
N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
-satisfy any realistic judgment.8 8
The plaintiffs further were not impressed with UCC's assertions,
that it would submit to the jurisdiction of an Indian court when those
assertions were not accompanied with promises to accept the judg-
ment of an Indian court.8 9 If UCC did challenge an Indian judg-
ment, the jurisdiction of an American court would have to be
invoked, pursuant the logic of Hilton v. Guyot, in order to determine if,
the due process conditions were in fact met.90 The Union of India
was willing to admit that its judicial system had enough shortcomings
to give Union Carbide Corporation plenty of fuel to challenge the,
due process it is afforded under Indian law.
"Stripped to its essentials," the plaintiffs argued, "the attempt
by Union Carbide to escape justice in the courts of its home forum is
nothing more than forum shopping." 9 ' By taking advantage of the
delay, inexperience, and procedural inadequacies of the Indian judi-
cial system, "the ultimate cost to the company is substantially dimin-
ished. ' '9 2 The plaintiffs pointed to the climate created by the GAF
(formerly General Aniline and Film) hostile takeover bid93 as a rea-
son for UCC's desperate attempt to seek an alternative forum: "In
the face of recurrent Wall Street speculation ... the company has
found the enormous contingent liability of the Bhopal litigations to
be of significant value. [It is] the 'ultimate poison pill.' ,94
3. Private and Public Interests
Even if UCC could successfully demonstrate that India's courts
offered an adequate alternative forum, the plaintiffs argued that the
private and public interests still did not balance in favor of moving
the litigation back to India.
a. Union Carbide Corporation is Ultimately Liable
Returning to its initial complaint, the plaintiffs emphasized that
it was suing UCC because the parent corporation was the ultimate
seat of liability.9 5 To subject UCC to adequate discovery required
the application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure under the
oversight of an American court. 96 Without the force of the rules of
88 Id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 91.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 90.
93 The GAF hostile takeover bid ended in 1986 with GAF being frustrated in its take-
over attempt but walking away $81 million richer. "[N]o potential suitor could arrange the
financing to acquire a company facing so much contingent liability." Wall St. J., Nov. 26,
1985, at 24, col. 3.
94 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 92.
95 See id. at 62, 105..
96 Id. at 89.
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discovery under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure the plaintiffs
could not hope to find evidence to support their counts of absolute
liability, strict liability, negligence, breach of warranty, and
misrepresentation.
During forum discovery, the plaintiffs were able to glimpse the
vast expanse of evidence under the control of Union Carbide Corpo-
ration.97 Moreover, the plaintiffs asserted that all relevant docu-
ments were within the control of the parent company and not
necessarily in the subsidiary's possession in India,98 even after the
documents were sealed by the Indian government. Whether tried in
the United States or in India, UCC would be forced to make a "trans-
national endeavor." 99
b. Witness Logistics
The Union of India contended that "Union Carbide's claim of
insurmountable hardship is disingenuous in view of the multina-
tional's operations in *more than 120 countries around the world
carried on through a world-wide management system and communi-
cations network."' 00 Indispensable witnesses, argued the plaintiffs,
were located in the United States. With respect to the victims, it was
stipulated early in the litigation that the victims had suffered and
died as a result of the gas leak. Thus, "[als a practical matter, all of
the victims will not be witnesses regardless of where these cases are
tried."' 0 '
The matters to be examined in litigation surrounding design de-
fect should not require witnesses from India, since the designs were
executed in the United States. In regard to UCC's need to proffer
witnesses to prove sabotage,' 0 2 the plaintiffs argued that sabotage
was a concocted defense from which Warren Anderson, UCC's Chief
Executive Officer, had distanced himself in Congressional hearings
in 1985.103 Moreover, the plaintiffs attacked UCC's need to prove
97 Id. at 95.
98 Id. at 93.
99 Id. at 97.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 100.
102 Sabotage was Union Carbide Corporation's single most reliable defense to charges
of strict liability and negligence. In strict liability, the plaintiff must show that the defective
product left the control of the defendant in a defective condition. If the defendant can
prove that the defect was introduced after the product was out of his control, the causation
chain is broken. Likewise, in negligence the plaintiff must prove that the chain of causa-
tion was not broken. If the defendant can prove that there was an unforeseeable interven-
ing cause between his negligent act and the harm to the plaintiff, the causation chain is
also broken. Union Carbide Corporation continued to assert sabotage, though without
identifying the exact source, up to the ultimate settlement in February 1989.
103 Release of Poison Gases & Other Hazardous Air Pollutants from Chemical Plants:Joint Hear-
ing Before the Subcommittee on Health & the Environment & the Subcomm. on Commerce, Transporta-
tion, & Tourism of the Committee on Energy & Commerce, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. 299-300 (1985).
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the negligent involvement of the government of India. Here, the
plaintiffs raised the contradiction that UCC claimed to adhere "to
safety and environmental standards imposed by the United States
government and Union Carbide itself rather than any lesser standard
of a host government."'' 0
4
Generally, the plaintiffs painted those issues of proof for which
UCC insisted it must have easy access to Indian witnesses and docu-
ments as being hollow. The issue of the seized documents in Bhopal
was an example of a situation strained to the point of making it seem
hypothetical. The plaintiffs insisted that UCC had complete access
to those documents at all times. When UCC countered that it did
not have access, the attorneys for the Union of India petitioned the
Indian court to order those documents made available to UCC. 10 5
c. Public Interest in the United States
The plaintiffs argued that the events in Bhopal are of interest to
the United States, if for no other reason than that the UCC plant at
Institute, West Virginia is practically identical to the Bhopal plant.
Though UCC officials insisted that a Bhopal type accident could not
happen at the United States facility, toxic gas did escape the West
Virginia plant injuring 100 persons in August 1985.106
The United States, moreover, has an interest in preventing
breaches of safety for its own domestic chemical industry and has an
interest in maintaining the trustworthy reputation of multinational
corporations based in the United States. The plaintiffs stated: "As
the leading industrialized nation in the world, the United States rec-
ognized that it was necessary to encourage American multinationals
to protect the health and well-being of peoples throughout the
world." 10 7 The plaintiffs argued that the stakes involved in the crash
of a commuter aircraft in Scotland, the facts behind the precedent
setting Piper decision, were very different from an industrial accident
resulting in the deaths of thousands and in injuries to thousands
more. "More than ever it was understood," the plaintiffs argued re-
ferring to congressional hearings,' 0 8 "that only the responsible be-
havior of U.S. corporations will protect the American image abroad
and promote exports of American technology."'10 9 The justice
meted out in American courts for breaches of that trust would have
an "enormous potential for the benefits of deterrence, both nation-
104 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 102.
105 Id. at 104.
106 Id. at 105.
107 Id.
108 The Implications of the Industrial Disaster in Bhopal, India: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Asian and Pacific Affairs of the Comm. on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 98th Cong., 2d
Sess. 23 (1984)(statement of Rep. Torricelli).
1o9 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 105.
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ally and worldwide."" l0
d. Public Interest of India
Plaintiffs argued that the Indian government's act of placing the
cause of action in a foreign forum is testimony that India's public
interest would be best served in a U.S. forum. Specifically, they
asserted:
The Union of India, by filing its complaint with this Court, made
clear its position that justice for the Bhopal victims can only be se-
cured in the United States. This extraordinary act of a foreign sov-
ereign seeking justice in an American court leaves no question as to
the public interest of India. I I'
In a footnote, the plaintiffs cited Panama Processes, S.A. v. Cities
Services Co., 1" 2 for the proposition that a court ordinarily must bal-
ance the competing stakes of two countries each asserting the inter-
ests of their own jurisdiction. The plaintiffs asserted: "Obviously,
the present case presents no such conflict since the Union of India
chose to litigate in the United States. Comity requires that this
Court accord that decision due respect."" l3 The Union of India's
argument that it knew what its own best interests were turned out to
be a serious miscalculation because UCC would argue successfully
that the Union of India did not know what were in its own best
interests.
III. Forum Non Conveniens Analysis in the District Court
In a long and detailed opinion, Judge John F. Keenan examined
each argument presented by the parties and several raised in an ami-
cus curiae brief."i 4 With three important exceptions, Judge Keenan
embraced the reasoning of Union Carbide Corporation emphasizing
the adequacy of the Indian courts and the involvement of the Indian
government in the entire history of the Bhopal facility as the key ele-
ments in support of a forum non conveniens dismissal of the plaintiffs'
cause of action."15
110 Id.
I'I Id. at 106-07.
112 650 F.2d 408, 414-15 (2d Cir. 1981).
113 Plaintiffs' Motion in Opposition, supra note 19, at 107 n. 25.
114 Memorandum of Individual Plaintiffs in Opposition to Union Carbide Corpora-
tion's Motion to Dismiss on the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens may be found in the
compilation by U. BAXi & T. PAUL, supra note 19, at 112-37. Supplemental Memorandum
of Law in Further Support of Union Carbide Corporation's Motion to Dismiss These Ac-
tions on the Grounds of Forum Non Conveniens may be found in the same source. Id. at
140-48. The same source includes the Amended Consolidated Complaint and Jury De-
mand, id. at 149-60, and Affidavit of Marc S. Galanter, id. at 165-22 1.
115 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. 842 (S.D.N.Y. 1986),
aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
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A. Adequacy of India's Courts
If two available forums are presupposed, the simple fact that the
defendant is "amenable to process in the other forum" should be
enough to show that the alternative forum is adequate. 1 6 Having
established "amenability to process"' " 7 as the one element which
clearly counts in the weighing of an alternative forum's adequacy,
Judge Keenan listed the elements which do not count." 8 Though
neither party asserted that relief to plaintiffs would be more justly
accorded under American tort law than under Indian law, Judge
Keenan nevertheless repeated the sti-icture of the Piper court that the
favorability of substantive law was not to be considered: "[I]f con-
clusive or substantial weight were given to the possibility of a change
in law, the forum non conveniens doctrine would become virtually
useless."' 19
One by one, Judge Keenan dispatched the shortcomings alleged
by the Union of India and the other plaintiffs of the Indian court
system. Judge Keenan was unimpressed by the allegation that Indian
courts were "colonial" in nature. 120 Neither was he perturbed by
plaintiffs' contention that Indian courts were ridden by delay. "This
Court acknowledges that delays and backlog exist in Indian courts,
but United States courts are subject to delays and backlog, too."' 2'
Moreover, Judge Keenan argued, the Indian government had at-
tempted to remedy the situation for the special cases of Bhopal liti-
gation by enactment of the Bhopal Act which gave the Union of India
its parens patriae status. 22
Judge Keenan found no merit in the allegation that the Indian
bar was inexperienced in' handling complex litigation. Merely be-
cause Indian attorneys did not practice in large law firms did not
render them incapable of handling complex litigation especially in
view of the fact that the principal legal officers of the government
would be involved in the litigation.' 2 3 Nor did Judge Keenan find
the inexperience of the Indian bench in handling complex litigation
convincing. Professor Galanter, the plaintiffs' expert witness, sug-
116 Id. at 845 (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 254 n.22).
117 The Indian Civil Procedure Code, 2 INDIA CODE part II § 9 (1970), grants jurisdic-
tion to Indian courts for "all suits of civil nature excepting suits of which their cognizance
is either expressly or impliedly barred." Jurisdiction over UCIL in Madhya Pradesh was
assured but jurisdiction over Union Carbide Corporation itself was not so certain without
the parent's consent. Note, The Razor's Edge: The Doctrine of Forum non Conveniens and the
Union Carbide Methyl Isocyanate Disaster at Bhopal, India, 10 N.C.J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 743,
750 (1985).
118 634 F. Supp. at 846.
119 Id. (quoting Piper, 454 U.S. at 250).
120 634 F. Supp. at 847-48.
121 Id. at 848 (citing Remarks of the Honorable Warren E. Burger, Chief Justice,
Supreme Court of the United States, 100 F.R.D. 499, 534 (1983)).
122 Id. at 848.
123 Id. at 849.
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gested that Indian judges were disinclined to promote settlements.
Judge Keenan not only found the allegation irrelevant, but took the
opportunity to point out that he was unable to promote a settlement
himself after having "labored hard and long."' 124 Concerning the
absence of class action suits and impleader, Judge Keenan suggested
that the Indian legislature was willing to consider innovations by evi-
dence of their passing the Bhopal Act.' 25 Judge Keenan likewise
, swept aside as insignificant matters concerning the unavailability of
juries and contingent fees for attorneys.' 26
Finally, with respect to the adequacy of Indian courts, Judge
Keenan did not find the absence of codified tort law a hindrance to
justice. He stated: "With the groundwork of tort doctrine adopted
from the common law and the precedential weight awarded British
cases, as well as Indian ones, it is obvious that a well-developed base
of tort doctrine exists to provide a guide to Indian courts presiding
over the Bhopal litigation."'127
B. Critical Shortcomings
Judge Keenan, despite his belief that the Indian courts were ade-
quate to resolve the Bhopal dispute, was concerned about two
shortcomings of the Indian court system. He found the limited dis-
covery rules of the Indian judicial system to be a true obstacle to the
plaintiffs' efforts to prove their case:
[Tihe only forms of discovery available in India are written interrog-
atories, inspection of documents, and requests for admissions. Par-
ties alone are subject to discovery. Third-party witnesses need not
submit to discovery. Discovery -may be directed to admissible evi-
dence only, not material likely to lead to. relevant and admissible
materials.... Parties are not compelled to provide what will be ac-
tual proof at trial as part of discovery. 12 8
Judge Keenan agreed these limitations would be burdensome.129 He
therefore invoked his power to "condition transfer under the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens" by requiring the consent of the defend-
ant to submit to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.130
The second shortcoming foreseen by Judge Keenan was the en-
forceability of an Indian judgment against UCC. Judge Keenan
found the ironic insistence by each party that a foreign forum was
more sophisticated to hear the case to indicate "a willingness to
abide by a judgment of the foreign nation Whose forum each seeks to
124 Id. at 851.
125 Id.
126 Id. at 851-52.
127 Id. at 849.
128 Id. at 850.
129 Id.
13o Id.
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visit.' 13 1 Nevertheless, to be on the safe side, Judge Keenan condi-
tioned the granting of the motion to dismiss:
on Union Carbide's agreement to be bound by the judgment of its
preferred tribunal, located in India, and to satisfy any judgment ren-
dered by the Indian court, and affirmed on appeal in India. Absent
such consent to abide by and "make good" on a foreign judgment,
without challenge except for concerns relating to minimal due pro-
cess, the motion to dismiss now under consideration will not be
granted.'3 2
At the very end of his opinion, Judge Keenan added a third con-
dition for the granting of the motion to dismiss. This third condi-
tion, included as a safety measure, would require UCC to submit to
the jurisdiction of the Indian courts once the cause of action against
it was dismissed in the American court.133 This last condition would
be the only one to survive on appeal.
Judge Keenan concluded that Indian courts were adequate to
serve the needs of justice 3 4 and that "differences between the two
legal systems, even if they inure to plaintiffs' detriment, do not sug-
gest that India is not an adequate alternative forum."' 35
C. Balance of Private Interests
In his analysis of the private interests which Gilbert and Piper re-
quire be addressed, Judge Keenan struck the second blow to the
plaintiffs' bid to have their day in an American court. Judge Keenan
found that India, her government and her citizens, had been inti-
mately involved in and had exerted a large measure of control over
the Bhopal operation throughout its history.
1. Access to Safety Data
Judge Keenan was particularly impressed with the comparison
of the number of Indians versus Americans working at the Bhopal
plant throughout its history. He found it significant that the Agricul-
tural Products Division of UCIL, the division under which the Bho-
pal plant was placed, was in operation for fifteen years with little
American contact.' 3 6 He found it significant that the last American
to be associated with the Bhopal facility had left more than one year
before the accident.13 7 He further found it significant that every di-
vision within the Bhopal plant was headed by an Indian national and
that in every department the head count of Indian nationals who
were employees exceeded 400. Judge Keenan performed the same
131 Id. at 852.
132 id.
'33 Id. at 867.
134 Id. at 852.
'35 Id.
136 Id. at 853.
137 Id.
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head-count analysis for the division headquarters and came to the
same conclusion, i.e. the operation of the division was firmly in the
hands of the Indian nationals.' 38
Judge Keenan found it especially noteworthy that most of the
safety audits of the Bhopal facility were conducted by Indian nation-
als under the authority of UCIL. Only three times (1979, 1980, and
mid-1982) did employees from UCC conduct safety audits. Judge
Keenan agreed that "these three events constitute a very small frac-
tion of the thousands of safety audits conducted at the Bhopal facil-
ity."1 3 9 In fact, in an instance of a phosgene leak that occurred at a
UCC plant in the United States, information regarding safety meas-
ures was obtained from the UCIL plant in India. 140
2. Design and Construction
Judge Keenan was unimpressed by plaintiffs' allegation that the
responsibility for all events occurring at the Bhopal plant must be
shouldered by UCC because the design "package" came from the
parent company. Beginning with the Union of India's initial Letter
of Intent issued in March, 1972, Judge Keenan found clear evidence
of the close involvement of not only the Indian government but
many Indian nationals. Judge Keenan also found that UCC and
UCIL were separate and distinct entities: "The Court is struck by
the assertion that the two agreements were negotiated at 'arms-
length' pursuant to Union Carbide corporate policy, and the Union
of India mandated that the Government retain specific control over
the terms of any agreements UCIL made with foreign companies
such as Union Carbide Corporation."' 4'a Judge Keenan apparently
accepted the notion that "Union Carbide related with UCIL much as
it would have with an unaffiliated, or even competing company."' 42
Once the Union of India issued the Letter of Intent in March,
1972, UCC, in Judge Keenan's view, was relegated to the status of
provider of the initial design package and the entire operation was
taken over by UCIL. Judge Keenan wrote: "The Design Transfer
Agreement indicates that Union Carbide's duty under the Agree-
ment was to provide process design packages, and that UCIL, not
138 Id. at 854.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 854-55.
141 Id. at 856. Judge Keenan appended a section from the Union Carbide Corporate
Policy Manual stating:
The "arms-length principle" is a central consideration in transfer and pricing
of all technology transactions with affiliates. "Arms-length" is defined as:
The principle whereby inter-company transactions between Union Carbide
and its affiliates, or between affiliates, will reflect the cost to unrelated parties
of the same or similar technology under similar circumstances.
Id.
142 Id. at n. 16.
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Union Carbide, would be responsible to 'detail design, erect and
commission the plant.' ",143 Judge Keenan also found UCC's issu-
ance of "limiting warranties with respect to the design packages" to
be additional evidence of UCIL's independent status in the Bhopal
plant's construction and commissioning.144
Judge Keenan gave great weight to affidavits submitted by UCC
that supported the narrowness of its role in the project. Quoting
from one of the affidavits, Judge Keenan said:
[T]he process design packages which Union Carbide Corporation
provided are nothing more than summary design starting points
.... They set forth only the general parameters .... A plant cannot
be constructed from a process design package. The detail design
comprises approximately 80 percent of the sum of the man hours
involved in the design of any project and transposes the general pro-
cess design parameters into an actual design which can be used for
purchasing equipment and actual construction. 14 5
As further evidence of UCC's limited involvement in the construc-
tion of the Bhopal plant, Judge Keenan pointed out that the parent
company's design engineers made only four visits to the Bhopal
plant prior to its start-up. 146
Judge Keenan contrasted UCC's narrow involvement in the ac-
tual design and construction of the Bhopal plant with the massive
detail of the actual work done by a local Indian engineering firm,
Humphreys and Glasgow. With respect to drawings from the parent
company that were translated to detail design, Judge Keenan ac-
cepted testimony that "at no time were Union Carbide Corporation
engineering personnel from the United States involved in approving
the detail design or drawings prepared upon which construction was
based. Nor did they receive notices of changes made." 14 7 Moreover,
the tanks which held'the lethal methyl isocyanate were "fabricated or
supplied by two named Indian sub-contractors" and the vent gas
scrubber, one of the fail-safe devices, was "fabricated in the Bhopal
plant shop." ' 4 8
3. Documentation and Witnesses
The nearly exclusive control of the Indian subsidiary, UCIL,
over the actual construction of the Bhopal plant had resulted in vast
quantities of records being located in India under the control of In-
dian authorities. Judge Keenan found that questions of fact gener-
ated by many of these documents could only be resolved by the
testimony of two witnesses, one of whom lived in Bhopal and the
143 Id. at 856.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 857.
148 Id.
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other assumed to be able to travel to either forum. 149 In addition,
Judge Keenan found the difficulty of language translation to tip the
balance in favor of trial in India since no translations would be neces-
sary in India where both English and Hindi are understood whereas
translations of all Hindi documents would be required in an Ameri-
can forum. 150
Judge Keenan also took into account the authority of the two
forums to compel witnesses to testify. He found that an American
court could not subpoena foreign nationals but that an Indian court
"probably" could subpoena employees of UCC on the basis of the
relationship of the parent company with its subsidiary.' 5 ' Even if an
American court could bring Indian witnesses under its jurisdiction,
officials of the Indian government would probably be immune to
process under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act.' 52 Moreover,
transportation of Indian witnesses to the United States, especially in
large numbers, would certainly be expensive. 153 Though Judge Kee-
nan admitted that a viewing of the accident site may not be neces-
sary, he maintained that it "conceivably could be called for later in
the litigation."' 54
4. On-going American Involvement
Judge Keenan found evidence of the "arms length" relationship
between UCC, the parent company, and UCIL, the subsidiary, even
in matters of training. Only forty Bhopal employees ever received
training at the sister plant in Institute, West Virginia; more than a
thousand employees were trained exclusively in India. Judge Kee-
nan noted: "[Tihe manual regarding start-up was'prepared by In-
dian nationals employed by UCIL [and] most of the documentary
evidence concerning design, training, safety and start-up, in other
words, matters bearing on liability, is to be found in India."' 155
Based on these facts, the on-going American involvement in UCIL
was found to be minimal.
5. Role of the Indian Government
In contrast to the minimal American involvement in the affairs
of UCIL, Judge Keenan found that the Indian Government was
deeply "involved in safety, licensing and other matters related to lia-
bility."' 156 Because of this involvement of the Indian Government
149 Id. at 858.
150 Id.
151 Id. at 859.
152 Id. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1990).
153 634 F. Supp. at 859.
154 Id. at 860.
155 Id. at 858.
156 Id. at 858-59.
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and its possession of most of the documents surrounding the com-
missioning of the Bhopal facility, Judge Keenan thought that the In-
dian government's interests were served best by having the trial in
India.
D. Balance of Public Interests
The public interest taken into account by Judge Keenan in his
forum non conveniens analysis were: court burdens, the national inter-
ests of the United States, the national interests of the Union of India,
and the specter of imperialism.
1. Classic Court Burdens
Judge Keenan recapped the logistical problems of conducting a
trial at a great distance from the scene of the accident, enumerating
the costs of translation, administrative costs, and the burdens on the
time and patience of jurors.' 57 He saw "no reason why this Court,
with its heavy burdens and responsibilities, should be burdened with
cases like these which, from every point of view, should be tried in
the courts of the nation where all the relevant events occurred and
whose citizens are primarily involved."' 58
2. American Interest in Deterrence
Judge Keenan showed little sympathy for the argument that
American-based multinational corporations enjoyed a "double stan-
dard" of liability. Whether American multinational corporations
must be judged by American standards for injuries "occurring on
foreign soil," appeared to Judge Keenan a moral question with which
he did not wish to tangle. He gave voice to the specifics of allega-
tions, however, before dismissing them:
The specific American interests allegedly to be served by this
Court's retention of the case include the opportunity of creating
precedent which will "bind all American multinationals hencefor-
ward,".., promotion of "international cooperation,".., avoidance
of an asserted "double standard" of liability, and the prevention of
"economic blackmail of hazardous industries which would extract
concessions on health and environmental standards as the price of
continuing operations in the United States."159
Though Judge Keenan did not frontally attack the above-quoted
public interests,1 60 he did attack the method of accomplishing them.
157 Id. at 861.
158 Id. at 861 (quoting Domingo v. States Marine Lines, 340 F. Supp. 811, 816
(S.D.N.Y. 1972)).
159 634 F. Supp. 862.
160 Later in his opinion, Judge Keenan considered the other motivations of multina-
tional corporations:
The supposed "blackmail" effect of dismissal by which plaintiffs are troubled
is not a significant interest of the American population, either. Surely, there
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Echoing the reasoning of the Piper Court, he maintained that
whatever deterrence "gained if their trial were held in an American
court is likely to be insignificant."' 16 1
3. Powerful Indian Interests
Whatever the American interest served by conducting the Bho-
pal litigation in an American court, that interest was out-weighed by
the interest of the Indian government having the litigation heard in
its own courts. Judge Keenan found that the program of "indianiza-
tion" of industry' 62 indicated that the Indian government under-
stood that its interests were best served by maintaining close control
over the activities of a foreign corporation operating within the
country. 163 He recounted numerous ways in which the Indian gov-
ernment exerted its control over UCIL, including indirect regulation
under a series of environmental laws:16
The recital.., demonstrates the immense interest of various Indian
governmental agencies in the creation, operation, licensing and reg-
ulation, and investigation of the plant. Thus, regardless of the extent of
Union Carbide's own involvement in the UCIL plant in Bhopal, or even in
its asserted "control" over the plant, the facility was within the sphere
of regulation of Indian laws and agencies, at all levels. 165
To drive home the significance of the Indian involvement, Judge
Keenan prefaced his recitation of those interests with the caveat from
Dowling v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc.-:166 "Though no single factor
should be determinative in ruling on a forum non conveniens motion,
the nature of the product and its status as regulated or not must be
considered."' 167 Clearly, the Indian regulation of UCIL's activities
was determinative in Judge Keenan's final decision:
As regulators, the Indian government and individual citizens even
have an interest in knowing whether extant regulations are ade-
quate. This Court, sitting in a foreign country, has considered the
extent of regulation by Indian agencies of the Bhopal plant. It finds
that this is not the appropriate tribunal to determine whether the
Indian regulations were breached, or whether the laws themselves
will be relaxing of regulatory standards by the responsible legislators of the
United States as a response to lower standards abroad. Other concerns than
bald fear of potential liability, such as convenience or tax benefits, bear on
decisions regarding where to locate a plant.
Id. at 865.
161 Piper, 454 U.S. at 260-61.
162 For a detailed description of the Indian government's policy on "foreign collabora-
tion" see Note, Foreign Investment in India, COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 609 (1988).
163 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 634 F. Supp. at 863.
164 Id. Emissions were monitored by a state water pollution board. State officials peri-
odically inspected the plant. Detailed inquiries were conducted by the government follow-
ing earlier accidents. Many agencies of the Indian government investigated the December
1984 gas leak. Id.
165 Id. at 863-64 (emphasis added).
166 727 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1984).
167 Id. at 616.
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were sufficient to protect Indian citizens from harm. It would be
sadly paternalistic, if not misguided, of this Court to attempt to eval-
uate the regulations and standards imposed in a foreign country. 16 8
In even stronger language, Judge Keenan inferred that India
was mature enough to make its own choices' 6 9 and should therefore
be willing to remedy a situation when those choices backfired. "In-
dia no doubt evaluated its need for a pesticide plant against the risks
inherent in such development."' 170 The danger of the double stan-
dard of liability while evaluating the acts of a multinational appears
less ominous where a government, such as India, is able to protect its
citizens through close regulation of industry.
4. Specter of Imperialism
Not only should India take control of its own affairs by litigating
the liability of foreign corporations within its own jurisdiction, coun-
seled the court, but the United States should resist stepping into In-
dian affairs. Judge Keenan quoted Harrison v. Wyeth Laboratories 171
with approval:
The impropriety of [applying American standards of product safety
and care] would be even more clearly seen if the foreign country
involved was, for example, India, a country with a vastly different
standard of living, wealth, resources, level of health care and serv-
ices, values, morals and beliefs than our own.... Should we impose
our standards upon them in spite of such differences? We think
not. 17
2
By essentially telling the Indian government that he knew better
what was good for India than the Indian government itself knew,
Judge Keenan adopted a paternalistic stance in decrying the evils of
paternalism:
This Court, too, thinks that it should avoid imposing characteristi-
cally American values on Indian concerns. The Indian interest in
creating standards of care, enforcing them or even extending them,
and of protecting its citizens from ill-use is significantly stronger
than the local interest in deterring multinationals from exporting al-
legedly dangerous technology. 173
Judge Keenan suggested that the Union of India might grow
stronger for taking on the difficulties of guiding the Bhopal litigation
through its own courts. He stated: "This litigation offers a develop-
ing nation the opportunity to vindicate the suffering of its own peo-
ple within the framework of a legitimate legal system."' 174
168 634 F. Supp. at 864.
169 Id. at 867. Judge Keenan noted that "the Union of India is a world power in
1986." Id.
170 Id. at 865.
171 510 F. Supp. I (E.D. Pa. 1980).
172 Id. at 4-5.
173 634 F. Supp. at 865.
174 Id. at 865-66.
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IV. Appellate Rejection of Conditions
Although UCC accepted the three conditions-submission to
India's jurisdiction, observance of the Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure for pre-trial discovery, and acceptance of the Indian court's
judgment-associated with Judge Keenan's order to dismiss the
plaintiffs' cause of action, UCC reserved the right of appeal. 'At the
appellate level, 17 5 the plaintiffs splintered into two groups: the
Union of India which had been the chief spokesman at the trial court
level and a confederation 'of individual plaintiffs represented by an
executive committee of American attorneys. While the individual
plaintiffs opposed the dismissal of the suit on grounds of forum non
conveniens, the Union of India accepted the decision. UCC, while sat-
isfied with the dismissal, appealed two of the conditions which Judge
Keenan had set on the dismissal, namely, consent to discovery under
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and acceptance of the judgment
of the Indian court.176
The Second Circuit not only approved Judge Keenan's dismissal
on grounds offorum non conveniens as within his sound discretion, but
stated "it might reasonably be concluded that it would have been an
abuse of discretion to deny aforum non conveniens dismissal."' 177 Even
the settlement of $350 million dollars between UCC and the individ-
ual plaintiffs was not viewed as incentive to reconsider.178
The real issues before the Court of Appeals were the conditions
which Judge Keenan had placed on the dismissal. Had UCC waived
its right to appeal those conditions by accepting the dismissal? Were
those conditions within the sound discretion of Judge Keenan? The
Second Circuit answered both questions in the negative.
A. Enough Prejudice to Preserve Appeal
The Second Circuit, citing United States v. Bedford Associates,179
found UCC's position to be "comparable to that of a prevailing party
which, upon being granted injunctive relief, is permitted to challenge
by appeal conditions attaching to the injunction that are found to be
objectionable."' 180 The entire decision was deemed reviewable be-
cause the plaintiffs had appealed and UCC had cross-appealed. "We
therefore have jurisdiction over the entire case and may in the inter-
ests of justice modify the district court's order."' 8 1 The appeals
panel found the first condition-UCC's consent to the Indian court's
175 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster, 809 F.2d 195 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
484 U.S. 871 (1987).
176 809 F.2d at 202.
177 Id. at 202.
178 Id. at 202-03.
179 618 F.2d 904, 913-16 (2d Cir. 1980).
18o 809 F.2d at 203.
181 Id.
1991] 569
570 N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG. [VOL. 16
personal jurisdiction-appropriate and well founded in law.' 8 2
B. Consent to Enforceability of the Judgment
The court found the imposition of consent to enforceability of
an Indian judgment in the United States to be erroneously based in
the notion that the Indian judgment might not otherwise be enforce-
able. In Island Territory of Curacao v. Solitron Devices, Inc.,18 the Sec-
ond Cicuit deemed any foreign judgment to be final and enforceable
in New York unless one of two exceptions applies: (1) the tribunal
was not impartial and due process was denied;' 8 4 or (2) the foreign
court did not have personal jurisdiction over the defendant.18 5
The court found that because New York law already addressed
the concern of the enforceability of the Indian judgment and because
the terms used by Judge Keenan in his conditional order might not
be construed with as much predictability as the terms of the statute,
the condition was unnecessary.' 8 6
Fearing that its due process rights would be infringed by the
Union of India,' 8 7 UCC asked the court to monitor the proceedings
in India. The Second Circuit chastised UCC's bid to have it both
ways, that is, to have its cause dismissed in favor of the Indian tribu-
nal, yet retain the protection of American courts just in case events
went awry. The proposal "evidences an abysmal ignorance of basic
jurisdictional principles, so much so that it borders on the frivolous,"
182 Id. at 203-04.
183 489 F.2d 1313, 1318-20 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 986 (1974).
184 If the Indian court had reached final judgment before Union Carbide Corporation
agreed to settle, the case probably would have reappeared in the New York federal district
court for an order to enforce the judgment. Both Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895), and
the New York statute, art. 53, Recognition of Foreign Country Money Judgments, 7B N.Y.
CIv. PRAC. L. & R. §§ 5301-5309 (McKihney 1978), provide a basis upon which Union
Carbide could reasonably contest the enforceability of the judgment. Specifically, Union
Carbide could have argued that the Union of India was both plaintiff and sovereign, and
may have held the third role of defendant if impleaded for negligence. Therefore, Union
Carbide could have argued that the tribunal in India was not impartial.
185 See 7B N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. § 5304. The New York statute provides for other
exceptions to recognition of a foreign judgment which the Second Circuit did not think
germane in this case:
1. The foreign court did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
2. The defendant did not receive adequate notice of proceedings.
3. The judgment was obtained by fraud.
4. The underlying cause of action was repugnant to public policy of the
state.
5. The judgment conflicts with another final and conclusive judgment.
6. The proceeding in a foreign court was contrary to agreement between
the parties.
7. Where based exclusively on personal service, the foreign court was a "se-
riously inconvenient forum."
186 809 F.2d at 205.
187 Union Carbide Corporation was distressed by the Union of India's attempt to
freeze its assets world-wide and by the Indian government's role as both plaintiff and de-
fendant in the suit in Indian courts. Id. at 204.
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wrote the Second Circuit.' 88 The court emphatically stated that
once the cause of action is dismissed, no judicial supervision is allow-
able until the issue comes back to the court for the purpose of en-
forcing the judgment.
C. Consent to Federal Rules Discovery
The Second Circuit found the requirement of making the de-
fendant observe the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in discovery
without an equal requirement on the plaintiff to be unfair.' 89 More-
over, where one party is a sovereign government, held the Second
Circuit, the imbalance is even more obvious.' 90 Because the court
did not elaborate, two possible conclusions may be drawn regarding
the effect of the plaintiff's sovereign status: one, because of the gov-
ernment's sovereign status, it must be limited by its own laws, which
in this case allow only limited discovery; or two, the Indian govern-
ment, by its sovereign status, is immune to any conditions an Ameri-
can court may seek to impose upon it outside that American court's
jurisdiction. Whatever the reason, by not allowing the use of the lib-
eral discovery rules of the United States, the court dashed any hopes
that the plaintiffs had of pursuing product liability claims. The U.S.
Supreme Court denied certiorari on October 5, 1987.191
D. After the Dismissal
The litigation would follow a course of many twists and turns in
the years following the forum non conveniens dismissal.
1. Route to Settlement
On September 5, 1986, according to an unreported opinion for
the Southern District of New York,' 92 "the Union of India com-
menced an action on behalf of all claimants in the Bhopal District
Court against Union Carbide. Some 5,500 earlier filed private suits
had been stayed .... [T]he government's action against Union Car-
bide was then litigated for some two and a half years." 1 93 In Decem-
ber of 1987, formal homicide charges were filed against Chief
Executive Officer Warren B. Anderson and eight other UCC officials.
Indian courts ordered UCC to pay $270 million in interim relief.
In May of 1988, the Union of India had UCC formally served
with charges of criminal wrongdoing. In November of 1988, the city
188 Id. at 205.
189 Id.
190 Id.
191 484 U.S. 871 (1987).
192 In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India, in December, 1984,
No. 626, 1989 WL 66673 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989).
193 Id. at 2.
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of Bhopal issued an arrest warrant for Anderson. Finally, in January
of 1989, the Indian government set up a special court to hear the
Bhopal case. That court declared Anderson a fugitive from justice in
February of 1989. Four days later, the Supreme Court of India an-
nounced a settlement of "all litigations, claims, rights, and liabilities
related to and arising out of the Bhopal Gas Disaster."'194 Union
Carbide agreed to pay $470 million dollars to the Registrar of the
Supreme Court of India as compensation to 525,000 claimants,' 95
effectively closing the books on the Bhopal episode for Union Car-
bide Corporation.
In June of 1989, the matter was back in Judge Keenan's court.' 96
American attorneys -representing individual Indian plaintiffs had not
been paid. F. Lee Bailey and Stanley M. Chesley, on behalf of them-
selves and as members of the Plaintiffs' Executive Committee,
wanted Judge Keenan to order that "legitimate costs and expenses
related to the Bhopal litigation in the United States" be reimbursed
from the $470 million settlement. 97 Repeating the Second Circuit's
emphatic rejection of any exceptions, Judge Keenan flatly refused:
"Once [the district court] dismisses [the United States] proceedings
on grounds of forum non conveniens it ceases to have any further
jurisdiction over the matter unless and until a proceeding may some
day be brought to enforce here a final and conclusive money judg-
ment."' 9 8 While Judge Keenan had nothing but kind words for the
efforts of the American attorneys saying "they demonstrated profes-
sionalism and a genuine concern for the victims and their families
[insuring] that those who suffered loss receive[d] fair and careful
representation here in the United States,"' 199 there was nothing he
could do to help them collect their fees from the settlement.
2. Ancillary Jurisdiction - Aborted End-Run
The matter of unpaid attorney fees was then appealed to the
Second Circuit.20 In the face of an argument asserting ancillary ju-
risdiction for the purpose of collecting attorneys' fees, the Second
194 Id.
195 Bhopal Payments by Union Carbide Set at $470 Million, N.Y. Times, Feb. 15, 1989, at
Al, col. 6.
196 1989 WL 66673 (S.D.N.Y. June 14, 1989).
197 Id. at 1.
198 Id. at 5.
199 Id. Throughout the Bhopal litigation, harsh words were published in the world
press and were uttered from the bench about the number of opportunistic American attor-
neys who rushed to Bhopal to enlist victims and survivors to file lawsuits in the United
States. John P. Coale of Washington, D.C., seemed to represent in the collective mind
these attorneys mainly because he was the first American attorney to arrive in Bhopal after
the leak. For a detailed description of Coale's experiences and of the subsequent animos-
ity directed toward him by judge Keenan, see D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 108-11, 127-
35, 175-79, 183, 195, 202-03, 213-20, 222-24.
200 Chelsey v. Union Carbide, 927 F.2d 60 (2d Cir. 1991).
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Circuit'retreated from its earlier hard-line on the finality of a forum
non conveniens dismissal stating:
In view of the general rule that ancillary jurisdiction to resolve fee
disputes continues after the initial litigation is no longer before the
court, and the wide array of situations in which that principle has
been applied, we decline to announce any general rule that a forum
non conveniens dismissal, without more, bars any subsequent exer-
cise of ancillary jurisdiction with respect to attorney's fees in the dis-
missed case.20 1
To establish ancillary jurisdiction, the court must have had subject
matter jurisdiction originally. 20 2 Since a court must have had juris-
diction before dismissing a case on the grounds of forum non con-
veniens, it was still within the court's discretion to allow the assertion
of ancillary jurisdiction.2 0 3 Forum non conveniens apparently had not
permanently closed the door to the American court.
Before the appellant attorneys could celebrate a reinstatement
of American jurisdiction, the Second Circuit blocked the entrance.
The attorneys had made no application for payment from the settle-
ment fund held by the Registrar of the Indian Supreme Court.20 4
Moreover, the distribution of the settlement funds was within the ju-
risdiction of the Indian courts. "It is hard to imagine any more di-
rect affront to comity than the relief sought," admonished the
Second Circuit.20 5 The court went on to hold that "it is not the busi-
ness of our courts to assume the responsibility for supervising the
integrity of the judicial system of another sovereign nation. Such an
assumption would directly conflict with the principle of comity." 20 6
Furthermore, common law prohibits one court "assuming in
rem jurisdiction over a res that is already under the in rem jurisdic-
tion of another court. ' 20 7 The rule, the Second Circuit maintained,
is no different when the other court is foreign. The court stated:
[A]lthough the prior forum non conveniens dismissal did not automati-
cally preclude any invocation of ancillary jurisdiction to consider ap-
pellants' application for attorney's fees and disbursements, that
jurisdiction may not be exercised, directly or indirectly, with respect
to the settlement fund on deposit in India under the supervision of
the Supreme Court of India.20 8
201 Id. at 65.
202 Id. at 64.
203 Id. at 65.
204 Id. at 66-67.
205 Id. at 66.
206 Id. (citingJhirad v. Ferrandina, 536 F.2d 478, 484-85 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
833 (1976)).
207 Id. (citing United States v. One 1985 Cadillac Seville, 866 F.2d 1142, 1145 (9th
Cir. 1989)).
208 Id. at 67 (emphasis omitted). A more complex argument asserting that a lien ex-
isted for attorneys' fees on the settlement fund was discounted because the settlement
monies were not paid directly to the victims, who were the individual clients of the attor-
ney claiming the lien. Because "petitioners never appeared in behalf of any party in the
1991] 573
N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.
In a concurrence, Judge Frank X. Altimari expressed his concern
that the Second Circuit's holding might create "the potential for the
'shared jurisdiction' we deemed 'illusory and unrealistic' in our prior
decision." 209 The dismissal of the attorneys' fee applications should
have been affirmed, in Judge Altimari's opinion, because of "lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. '210
The Second Circuit may appear to have reopened the door of
the jurisdiction it seemed to close so tightly in its affirmation of
Judge Keenan's first decision in the Bhopal litigation. 211 Nonethe-
less, theforum non conveniens dismissal appears to be final, at least as
far the merits of the case are concerned.
IV. Bhopal's Lessons for Parties to Joint-Venture Negotiations
What lessons can negotiators on both sides of a hazardous joint-
venture learn from the Bhopal experience? Multinational corpora-
tions will wish to do everything possible at the inception of a joint-
venture to limit their potential liability in the event of a serious toxic
spill. Likewise, third world host nations will want to do everything
possible to ensure the burden of loss will not unfairly shift back to
them in the event of a disaster. The Bhopal litigation suggests that
negotiators' give-and-take should be focussed on the following criti-
cal factors.
A. Ensuring Adequacy of the Forum
An adequate alternate forum is the threshold consideration for
dismissing a suit against an American citizen in an American court.
Because the burden for proving the existence of such a forum rests
with the party moving for dismissal, multinational negotiators must
assure themselves that the host country has what an American court
would deem an "adequate" alternative forum. A third world host
nation, on the other hand, will find itself in an embarrassingly ironic
position if it attempts to deny the adequacy of its own forum. As
India's attempt to rebut UCC's assertion of an adequate Indian fo-
Indian litigation or made any application for fees therein," the Second Circuit refused to
apply any lien analysis. Id. at 8.
209 Id. at 69 (citing In re Union Carbide, 809 F.2d 195, 205 (2d Cir. 1987)).
210 Id.
211 A rivalry between the Second Circuit and Judge Keenan becomes apparent on
close examination of the four opinions regarding Bhopal. Judge Keenan's first opinion-a
detailed and thoroughly reasoned example of judicial analysis-granted a forum non con-
veniewns dismissal with some reservations. It was upheld but modified by the Second Circuit
in shorter but sharply worded opinion stating that Judge Keenan's reservations were un-
warranted. When Judge Keenan was faced with the application of the attorneys, he dis-
missed the cause of action without reservations in a short opinion using the same sharp
wording of the Second Circuit. The Second Circuit then upheld Judge Keenan again but
insisted on a different analysis-a detailed and thorough judicial analysis offering some
reservations.
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rum illustrates, such a defense is not only unlikely to move an Ameri-
can court to sympathy but is very likely to elicit a storm of domestic
criticism.
1. Lesson to Multinationals: Be Amenable to Process
The Bhopal decisions technically require little more than the de-
fendant should be "amenable to process" within the foreign coun-
try's court. Other considerations, such as the efficiency, the
sophistication, or the experience of that court were deemed of no
consideration by the district court in the Bhopal litigation. The ap-
peals court maintained that as long as a foreign judgment was en-
forceable under American law and as long as procedural rules were
equal for both parties, the fact that the defendant was willing to sub-
mit to the jurisdiction of the foreign court was enough to legitimize
the alternative forum. Apparently, the mere declaration of willing-
ness to submit to the jurisdiction of a host nation's courts meets the
threshold requirement which will allow an American court to apply
the forum non conveniens doctrine in favor of the multinational.
2. Lesson to Host Nations: Make a Judicial Inventory
Across the negotiating table, the third world host nation should
be sure its forum actually is capable of handling the sort of complex
litigation a mass toxic tort will produce. If a third world host nation
finds its judicial system may falter under the weight of a complex,
multi-million dollar lawsuit for mass toxic tort damages, it would do
well to name the forum of another agreeable experienced nation.
While multinational negotiators might balk at the selection of the
United States or the World Court at the Hague, agreement on an-
other third world nation with a tradition of English common law
might be palatable to both parties. The best solution may be agree-
ment to submit all disputes to binding arbitration. The multina-
tional corporation and the host nation would each select an
arbitrator and the two selected would choose a third.
3. Lesson to Host Nations: Make a Substantive Law Inventory
Before third world governments enthusiastically sign up for haz-
ardous joint-ventures, they should take a hard look not only at the
overall capacity of their court systems but also at the substantive law
which undergirds that system. India's British colonial experience
provided it with some of the common law upon which products lia-
bility litigation must be based. But many third world nations have
little statutory or traditional law to enable them or their citizens to
file a claim of relief for damages resulting from Bhopal-like
incidents.
It is not practical to expect third world nations to legislate the
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necessary substantive law before embarking on hazardous joint-ven-
tures. The very absence of such substantive law is a strong motiva-
tion to multinationals for investing in hazardous joint-ventures in
third world countries. Additionally, legislating wholesale the law of
another country such as the Restatement (Second) of Torts or the Uniform
Commercial Code would certainly get needed statutes on the country's
books, but without the case law which interprets them, a third world
host nation would be walking in ill-fitting shoes.
4. Lesson to Host Nations: Make a Procedural Rules Inventory
Naming the alternative forum in the initial agreement suggests a
way third world host nations may overcome deficiencies in discovery
rules. No other nation maintains procedural rules for pre-trial dis-
covery as liberal as those the United States employs in federal courts.
The Second Circuit did hold that a federal judge may not impose the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure outside his jurisdiction. However,
this does not prevent parties to an agreement from voluntarily
adopting those rules at the time they select the forum for their
disputes.
5. Lesson to Host Nations: Ensure Judgment Enforcement
"A defeat for the whole Third World" is the way Indian attor-
ney, Vibhuti Jha of Bhopal, characterized the UCC settlement. 212
Had the case gone to judgment in the Indian court, "it would have
been a test case. We would have come to know whether an order of
the Indian judiciary would have been upheld by an American court,"
lamented Jha.2 13 The astute observer notes that even though the
case did not go to judgment, the Second Circuit did express its think-
ing on the enfoceability of foreign judgments when it left the door
open for UCC to challenge the judgment of the Indian court on due
process grounds.
The Bhopal experience suggests that even if a third world host
nation has a court system grounded on adequate substantive law and
supported by liberal procedural rules, that nation remains vulnerable
if it cannot collect a judgment in its favor. Binding arbitration like-
wise must be founded on the underlying clout of the winning party
to prevent the loser from repudiating the outcome and retreating to
a judgment-proof sanctuary. Even where a jurisdiction has statutes
supporting the enforcement of judgments, loopholes such as a due
process challenge can subvert the judgments.
Judge Keenan ruled that if an American-based multinational
wishes to avoid liability in an American court in favor of adjudication
212 Barr, supra note 15, at 105.
213 Id.
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in an alternate forum, then that multinational must affirmatively con-
sent to accept the judgment of the alternate forum. Although the
Second Circuit would not allow Judge Keenan's ruling to hold the
force of law, nothing prevents parties to a joint-venture from stipu-
lating exactly that arrangement in their initial agreement. A third
world host nation should insist that a multinational joint-venture
partner give prior consent to be bound by any impartial judgment
which the agreed upon forum might hand down.
B. Significant Stake in Regulation
In negotiating a joint-venture arrangement with a third world
country, multinational corporations may find the reduced level of
regulation in that country to be an attractive feature of the arrange-
ment.214 Yet, a dearth of such regulation may undermine the mul-
tinational corporation's reliance on the protection afforded by forum
non conveniens. A conclusion inherent in the Bhopal decisions is that
the greater the level of government regulation at every stage of the
development of the joint-venture, the more likely an American court
will be to use that government interest to overrule a long list of other
interests that support adjudication in an American jurisdiction.2 15
The Bhopal decisions clearly indicate that the multinational may pro-
tect its own interests best by encouraging host nations to pass regu-
lation if that regulation is not forthcoming.
1. Lesson to Multinationals: Invite Regulation
Even if merely on paper, the host government should be invited
to set limits on the involvement of the parent company and invited to
exercise control over the subsidiary located within its borders.21 6
The host government should be invited to inspect plans, designs,
and drawings for plants and manufacturing processes from the earli-
est stages of the project's development. Contractors and sub-con-
tractors should be employed from the host country to build the
plant. Wherever possible the physical presence of American citizens
214 Neither American court addressed the fact that while "India claims to follow a
tough environmental policy, . . . the statutes that have been passed are weak and are mis-
managed by poorly funded, poorly staffed, and badly trained bureaucracies." Dhavan, For
Whom? And for What? Reflections on the Legal Aftermath of Bhopal, 20 TEX. INT'L L.J. 295, 306
(1985).
215 "Ironically," wrote Allin C. Seward, III, associate. general counsel of Upjohn In-
ternational, Inc. the existence of pervasive and intrusive regulation by a foreign jurisdic-
tion may have the effect of reinforcing a district court's willingness to dismiss a case
brought by foreign plaintiffs. This type of regulation, while bothersome as a compliance
matter, may have the unintended benefit of reinforcing the local interest in the contro-
versy. Seward, After Bhopal: Implications for Parent Company Liability, 21 INT'L LAw. 695, 706
(1987).
216 See Note, An Economic Approach to Forum Non Conveniens Dismissals Requested By U.S.
Multinational Corporations-The Bhopal Case, 22 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 215, 247
(1988).
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within the host country should be kept to a minimum number and to
a short duration. Moreover, the number of nationals who are trained
outside of the host country, especially in the United States, should be
kept under ten percent.
Multinational negotiators should urge host nations to make reg-
ular safety inspections of the manufacturing facility and its processes.
All records relating to the process and facility should be maintained
on the premises or at least within the host country. The multina-
tional should invite the host government to participate in long-range
planning as well as enact regulations pertaining to the operation of
the joint-venture.
A close reading of the Southern District of New York'sforum non
conveniens dismissal of the Bhopal case and the Second Circuit's affir-
mation of that dismissal suggests that it is unnecessary to provide
proof that any involvement of the host government was in fact effica-
cious. The opportunity available for the host government to further
its own interests seems to be enough. The Bhopal decisions indicate
that whether the host government chooses to make its influence felt
is the business of the host government and not of the American
courts.
2. Lesson to Host Nations: Flex Regulatory Muscle
The host nation, on the other hand, should seize the opportu-
nity to flex its regulatory muscle at every stage of the joint-venture.
If the host nation cannot produce expertise locally to review plans, to
supervise construction and to conduct on-going inspections, it would
do well to bring in foreign consulting firms such as subcontractors to
accomplish this oversight. Because of their aversion to imperialism,
third world nations sometimes bristle at the suggestion that they
should depend on the services offered by more advanced nations.
Yet, when an accident does happen, these same host nation plaintiffs
turn without hesitation to the work done by foreign experts to estab-
lish the multinational's negligence. To protect their citizens, these
host nations should be willing to employ foreign expertise as preven-
tive regulators.
3. Lesson to Host Nations: Counter "Imperialism" Cautiously
"At some point," wrote Karl Hofstetter, "advantage for regulat-
ing [multinational enterprises] shifts to the home country."'2 17 The
Bhopal opinions suggest that not only the "advantage" but also the
"obligation" shifts to the host country the moment that country is
shown competent to regulate its own affairs. India made a deter-
mined point that in its joint-ventures with multinational corporations
217 Hofstetter, supra note 22, at 325.
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it held the status of equal, if not superior, partner. Judge Keenan
was more than willing to accept India's status as a "major power"
but went on to opine that with this prestige also came the responsi-
bility to take care of itself.
If host nations allow internal political concerns, lack of sophisti-
cation, or corrupt indifference to subvert that obligation to regulate,
they cannot expect sympathy from American courts when the un-
supervised negligence of a multinational partner results in disaster.
Judge Keenan demonstrated that the imperialism accusation is a two-
edged sword. If third world host nations loudly announce their sta-
tus and stubbornly resist interference from more advanced nations
during the planning and implementation of a hazardous enterprise,
they cannot plead their vulnerability and demand redress from ad-
vanced nations when the hazardous enterprise backfires.
C. Parent/Subsidiary Relationship
Since the Bhopal disaster in 1984, many observers have ex-
pressed concern about multinational corporations' tactics to limit
their liability by spawning complex webs of independent subsidiar-
ies. Judge Keenan and the Second Circuit seemed unimpressed with
such allegations of corporate "blackmail." They set a precedent of
taking joint-venture partners at their word, rather than probing into
the realities behind those words. Neither American court in the Bho-
pal litigation required that multinational corporations demonstrate
by direct evidence that their subsidiaries are actually independent. 218
Testimony to that goal appears adequate. Therefore, a multinational
corporation, even when forming an ad hoc subsidiary to serve a single
isolated contract, would do well to publish protestations of the sub-
sidiary's independence.
1. Lesson to Multinationals: Declare Subsidiary Independence
The courts in the Bhopal litigation did not require that a subsid-
iary in a host country be at "arms length" with the parent company,
but in the weighing of the host government's interest, some impor-
tance was attached to the host government being able to control the
actions of the subsidiary without having to exert control over the
parent corporation. For this reason, from the multinational corpora-
tion's viewpoint, a structure with a free-standing subsidiary would be
desireable. 2 19
218 The invitation for the host government to regulate the industry seems to contra-
dict the natural inclination of the corporation to limit liability and the host government to
allow that limitation. "Both the developed and developing nations routinely permit large
corporations to do business through subsidiaries and thus limit their liability, subject to
rules which are designed to ensure that at least a reasonable amount of capital is exposed
within each debt-incurring, risk-creating activity." Westbrook, supra note 21, at 325.
219 See Seward, supra note 215, at 706-07.
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The relationship of UCIL to the parent company, UCC, was
never squarely addressed by the courts throughout the litigation.
While the two entities were presented as functioning at some dis-
tance from one another during the forum non conveniens stage of the
litigation, neither UCC nor the Union of India behaved as though
they believed the myth of UCIL's independent status. If UCIL had
been truly independent of UCC, the simple abandoning of the entire
subsidiary to the Indian government might have made more sense
than a protracted settlement.
2. Lesson to Host Nations: Ensure a Collateral Stake
A host nation can do little to affect the corporate inter-relation-
ships of parents and subsidiaries with whom they make joint-venture
agreements. The host nation, however, can require the subsidiary to
maintain a significant stake within the boundaries of the host nation.
Requiring land and equipment to be titled in the subsidiary's name
or requiring the maintenance of a certain cash reserve in host nation
banks could discourage multinationals from maintaining such an
under-capitalized presence that walking away from a mass toxic tort
would be attractive. Requiring extensive liability insurance might
also provide the necessary stake.
D. Hard Settlement Lessons
The less liquid the multinational's financial stake in the host na-
tion, the greater the motive for an offending multinational corpora-
tion to settle rather than fight or flee. The unfolding of the
settlement negotiations which followed the Bhopal disaster offers
important lessons to both partners in a hazardous joint-venture.
1. Lesson to Multinationals: Keep Profit Motive Uppermost
Was UCC's settlement calculated to maintain control of a lucra-
tive subsidiary which continued to operate at a good profit?220 UCC
settled the Bhopal dispute in 1989 by agreeing to deposit $470 mil-
lion with the Indian government. When reduced by insurance recov-
eries, 221 the total settlement liability was $237 million. 222
220 Profit figures available for 1983 suggest a low rate of return on Union Carbide
Corporation's investment in Union Carbide India Limited-7-8%. The parent corpora-
tion was also suffering from a downturn in profitability in 1983. "In 1984, the company's
after-tax profit [$6.80 per share] amounted to only about 60 percent of the after-tax profits
generated by its chief rivals, Dow Chemical [$10.70], Du Pont [$12.00], and Monsanto
[$11.80]." P. SHRIVASTAVA, supra note 13, at 35 n.l. As profitability for the entire corpora-
tion improved in the second half of the decade, a higher rate of return would also be
expected from the UCIL subsidiary.
221 Union Carbide Corporation won a decision in the Connecticut Supreme Court al-
lowing it to file claims with the state association set up to pay claims on behalf of failed
insurance companies. Union Carbide Corp. v. Connecticut Ins. Guaranty Assoc., No.
13934 (Conn. Feb. 5, 1991). Union Carbide hopes to recover $32.5 million from the fund
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Hints to an understanding of the settlement figure are the assets
and the profitability of the total UCIL operation. At the time of the
accident, UCIL had assets of $175 million,223 annual sales of $170
million 224 and profits of $12.3 million.2 25 Some would consider
UCIL "expendable" in the light of the parent company's net worth
of $7 billion in 1987.226
The settlement figure suggests the parent corporation antici-
pated enough profits from the UCIL operations over the long term
to justify increasing the settlement figure from the originally offered
$350 million to $470 million. In fact, UCC had doubled the com-
pany's out-of-pocket liability in the closing days of the settlement
bargaining. UCC announced in 1989 that "a one-time charge of
43 cents per share [was enough] to write off the costs of the
litigation. ' 22 7
2. Lesson to Host Nations: Renege at Your Peril
While UCC's sales and earnings made steady gains during the
Bhopal litigation, the parent was not immune to new assaults after
the $470 million settlement was paid to the Registrar of the Indian
Supreme Court. UCC stock fell more than seven percent on nearly
two million shares traded upon the announcement of India's new
prime minister, V.P. Singh, that his government might nullify the set-
tlement and take UCC back to the Indian courts. 228 In addition to
refiling the $3 billion suit against UCC, the new prime minister
threatened to refile criminal charges as well.
The refiling of the charges never materialized. Had the Indian
government nullified the settlement, it would have faced the continu-
ance of litigation which had been in its courts for more than four
years already. If, upon nullification, the Indian government refused
to return the $470 million lump sum, the government would have
provided UCC with credible evidence that the parent corporation's
due process rights had been violated, exactly the sort of evidence
UCC would need to challenge in New York federal court the enforce-
for its liabilities in the Bhopal settlement. If all of Union Carbide Corporation's insurers
had made good on their claims, the total bill to Union Carbide for the settlement would
have been $217.5 million. State Court Says Carbide Can Collect Millions in Insurance, NAT'L L.J.
Feb. 18, 1991, at 44.
222 Barr, supra note 15, at 105 (the figure was reported in the 1988 annual report).
Union Carbide Corporation's profits for 1990 were $720 million. Id.
223 D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 181 (the 1983 figure is probably a conservative
"book value").
224 In 1984, Union Carbide India Limited was the twenty-first largest company in In-
dia. Besides the parent's holding of more than half the shares in UCIL, there were 24,000
individual shareholders. See SHRIVAsTAVA, supra note 13, at 36.
225 D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 24 (1983 figures).
226 Id. at 181.
227 Coil, India Seeks New Bhopal Settlement, WASH. POST, Jan. 13, 1990, at Cl.
228 Arndt, India Jolts Carbide on Settlement, Cni. TRIB., Jan. 23, 1990, § 3, at 1.
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ment of whatever judgment the Indian court might have finally
handed down. If the Indian government did return the $470 million,
UCC certainly would have weighed carefully a decision to write off
the entire Indian subsidiary which UCC continued to assert as fully
independent of the parent corporation.
E. Moral Responsibility and Public Opinion
Was the size of the Bhopal settlement designed to assuage
UCC's corporate conscience? A sense of moral responsibility may
have played a role in the final settlement figure.2 29 Warren B. An-
derson, the chairman of UCC, seems to have felt a close relationship
with the Indian subsidiary, subjecting himself to the humiliation of
arrest upon his arrival in Bhopal shortly after the accident. Ander-
son took the risk of going to India to offer interim aid to Indian au-
thorities, aid which was consistently rebuffed until the matter had
officially reached their courts. 230
The long lapse of time between the accident and the final settle-
ment probably muted the intensity of world opprobrium over the
disaster at Bhopal. Public outcry at gross corporate negligence does
not seem to have a real influence on the mechanics of complicated
settlement negotiations. When the Chisso Corporation's methyl-
mercury dumping at Minimata Bay was revealed, for example, a mas-
sive demonstration of public anger buffeted the corporation and the
Japanese government. 2 31 Thirty years later in 1990, individual set-
tlements were still disputed and unpaid. 23 2 UCC's corporate health
actually improved in the four year period between the accident and
the settlement suggesting that public opinion may not have signifi-
cantly contributed to the reaching of a settlement. The dangerous-
ness of the world works against maintaining the spotlight of world
opinion on a disaster such as Bhopal long enough to have significant
effect. In 1986, the nuclear accident at Chernobyl swept the suffer-
ing of the Indian people off the front pages and out of the world
consciousness. 233 Since the 1989 revolutions in Eastern Europe,
229 After the retirement of Warren B. Anderson, Union Carbide Corporation did not
mention moral responsibility. Rather, the parent corporation insisted right up to the set-
tlement that the leak was caused by the "deliberate act" of a "disgruntled employee."
Union Carbide Corporation also insisted that it was not "liable for a mishap at its . . .
Indian subsidiary, because the companies were run separately." Barr, supra note 15, at
101.
230 D. KURZMAN, supra note 16, at 116-19, 125-27.
231 See Kuriki, Minimata's Heroes: Industry Poisoned Their Lives, But Not Their Spirits, Cm.
TRIB., Aug. 26, 1990, § 6 at 1.
232 During the 1950's and 60's, Chisso Corporation dumped methyl-mercury, a by-
product of acetaldehyde production, into the ocean. However, in mid-1989, the corpora-
tion paid out $611 million on a 1973 court settlement. Only 1760 persons had been veri-
fied for settlement payment with 8,185 turned down and 2,794 unsettled. Id.
233 See Mitchell, Shadow of Chernobyl: Five Years Later, Anger, Disease Mark Radiation Vic-
tims, NEWSDAY, Apr. 26, 1991, at 5.
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massive radioactive and chemical contaminations caused by the inep-
titude of the ousted socialist governments are now being uncovered.
The dissolution of the Soviet Union likewise has revealed a history of
environmental disasters which boggles the world's collective mind.
In the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, toxic damage once exper-
ienced only as the result of negligence became a calculated weapon
of war. World opinion reacted to columns of smoke rising from de-
liberately torched oil wells, to vast oil slicks deliberately released for
the purpose of contaminating the Persian Gulf, and to lethal chemi-
cal weapons deliberately sprayed onto villages of defenseless Kurds.
In the face of intentional torts perpetrated by governments on such
large scale, the occasional negligence of a multinational corporation
participating in a joint-venture with a cash-hungry third world nation
may no longer command undivided world attention and censure.
That global opprobrium is least likely to be forthcoming where the
damage for such negligence remains contained within the borders of
the host nation.
F. Self-Insurance is Net Effect
Is it realistic to expect third world host nations to protect them-
selves from the potential negligence of a multinational manufacturer
of hazardous products? With each defensive measure a host nation
institutes, the attractiveness of the joint-venture decreases encourag-
ing the multinationals to look elsewhere. Third world host nations
are unlikely to tip the balance of power in their own favor.
If a multinational can guarantee that it will not be held liable
before an American tribunal under products liability theories and if a
multinational can sufficiently structure the relationship of its subsidi-
ary to insulate the parent, then liability can be effectively limited to
whatever equity the multinational holds within the borders of the
host country. As third world countries become more anxious to gar-
ner joint-ventures with American-based multinationals, host govern-
ments make available investment-credits and other incentives, thus
effectively reducing the amount of equity which would be susceptible
to seizure in the event of a mass toxic tort. The total equity which a
multinational holds within the borders of the host nation may func-
tion as a cap for any settlement negotiations in the event of a mass
toxic tort.
World opinion and future good will are the only realistic pro-
phylaxis to allowing the equity in the joint venture to function as a
self-insurance cap. UCC demonstrated over the five year period of
its Bhopal litigation that even these two factors are quickly dis-
counted especially when a corporation's over-all financial strength is
growing.
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V. Cautious Look to the Future
With the multinational corporations holding most of the high
cards, third world host nations will be hard pressed to even the
score, much less win, in the event of a mass toxic tort of the magni-
tude of Bhopal. Yet, with the increasing numbers of hazardous joint-
ventures being struck by these two players, the rest of the world can-
not ignore the unevenness of the game. The vulnerable position of
third world host nations calls for international standardization
through comparative law, international guidelines, or even interna-
tional minimal standards, according to some observers.2 34 Espe-
cially with environmental protection and worker safety, the only
hope the third world has to both profit from the desire of multina-
tionals to locate potentially hazardous manufacturing in their coun-
tries and to protect themselves from the social costs of gradual
pollution, as well as dramatic toxic tort, is to join in a cooperative
effort to set certain minimal standards which all will enforce in their
dealings with the multinationals.2 3 5
As an alternative, ready access to American courts, American
tort law, and American procedural rules can enable third world host
nations to obtain necessary relief for harm done to its citizens. A
statutory cancellation offorum non conveniens protection would have to
be effected in order to provide this access.
The United States Senate seems willing to impose greater liabil-
ity on parent corporations for the wrong-doing of their off-shore
subsidiaries as evidenced by passage of the controversial Omnibus
Export Administration Amendments Act of 1991 over President
George Bush's veto.2 36 The proposed law would hold parent corpo-
rations liable under pain of losing export privileges if one of their
off-shore subsidiaries were discovered trading in materials necessary
to produce chemical and biological weapons. Senator Jesse Helms
vehemently denounced the practice of corporations insulating them-
selves from such liability and insisted that the American standard was
to impute the knowledge of the subsidiaries to the corporate par-
ent.23 7 Although the Senate passed the bill over the President's veto
by a resounding vote in February, 1991, the bill, at this writing, lan-
234 Hofstetter, supra note 22, at 323. Hofstetter suggests that "mandatory insurance
schemes" either public or private along with a list of attractive alternatives for which few
third world host nations have the economic clout to enforce. Id. at 321. In a note, Hofstet-
ter gives off-hand recognition of the unreality of clout. Id. at n. 131. See also Forbes, Lim-
ited Liability & the Development of the Business Corporation, 2 LAw ECON. & ORG. 163, 165
(1986) (limited liability among consensual parties can substitute for insurance).
235 HOFSTET-rER, supra note 22, at 323-24.
236 S.320, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. (1991).
237 Senator Jesse Helms declared:
Any clever corporate executive could set up five subsidiaries that sell princi-
pally to the United States and another separate subsidiary the sole purpose
of which is to sell chemical weapons to Iraq .... Under the Senate version
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guishes in the House Judiciary Committee with odds-makers giving it
a low chance of being reported to the House floor.
Considering this legislative experience with expanding the lia-
bility of parent corporations for the off-shore misdeeds of their sub-
sidiaries, a statutory cancellation of forum non conveniens seems
unlikely in the near future. The evolution of efforts to curb the
proliferation of hazards in the form of chemical and biological weap-
ons, however, suggests that traditional means of limiting liability by
spinning off independent subsidiaries may become the focus of in-
tense scrutiny by Congress. Another accident on the order of Bho-
pal-may be impetus enough for Congress to demand that American
courts adjudicate the wrong-doing of American corporations regard-
less of whether the actual harm occurred inside or outside American
borders.
VI. Conclusion
The legacy of the Gas Leak Disaster in Bhopal has been to
strengthen the bargaining hand of the multinational corporation in
the formation of joint ventures involving hazardous production
processes. As major industrial nations become more sensitive to en-
vironmental damage and to protection of workers, the pressure for
the multinationals to spread their risk by branching out into the envi-
ronmentally unsophisticated third world will continue to grow. The
harder the multinationals are squeezed with regulations at home, the
more likely they will move out into an unregulated realm of the third
world.
Forum non conveniens as applied in the Bhopal litigation basically
supplies American-based multinational corporations with a free hand
to export hazardous manufacturing processes to the third world
while at the same time significantly limiting their liability for the
damage their processes may cause. While host nations may attempt
to equalize their positions in the formation of hazardous joint-ven-
tures, the pressure for hard currency and foreign trade is likely to
cancel any advantage. Third world host nations must be supported
by international efforts to bolster their positions. American
lawmakers should examine whether the free hand multinational cor-
porations enjoy in the conduct of hazardous joint-ventures in other
countries is in the best interests of the United States and the world.
... the parent corporation ... the five subsidiaries . . . become prohibited
corporations because of the poison gas sales of the sixth.
136 CONG. REC. at S17185 (daily ed. Oct. 26, 1990)(statement of Sen. Helms).
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